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Abstract
We define a language CQP (Communicating Quantum
Processes) for modelling systems which combine quan-
tum and classical communication and computation.
CQP combines the communication primitives of the pi-
calculus with primitives for measurement and transfor-
mation of quantum state; in particular, quantum bits
(qubits) can be transmitted from process to process
along communication channels. CQP has a static type
system which classifies channels, distinguishes between
quantum and classical data, and controls the use of
quantum state. We formally define the syntax, oper-
ational semantics and type system of CQP, prove that
the semantics preserves typing, and prove that typing
guarantees that each qubit is owned by a unique process
within a system. We illustrate CQP by defining models
of several quantum communication systems, and outline
our plans for using CQP as the foundation for formal
analysis and verification of combined quantum and clas-
sical systems.
1 Introduction
Quantum computing and quantum communication have
attracted growing interest since their inception as re-
search areas more than twenty years ago, and there has
been a surge of activity among computer scientists dur-
ing the last few years. While quantum computing offers
the prospect of vast improvements in algorithmic effi-
ciency for certain problems, quantum cryptography can
provide communication systems which will be secure
even in the presence of hypothetical future quantum
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computers. As a practical technology, quantum com-
munication has progressed far more rapidly than quan-
tum computing. Secure communication involving quan-
tum cryptography has recently been demonstrated in a
scenario involving banking transactions in Vienna [19],
systems are commercially available from Id Quantique,
MagiQ Technologies and NEC, and plans have been re-
ported to establish a nationwide quantum communica-
tion network in Singapore. Secure quantum communi-
cation will undoubtedly become a fundamental part of
the technological infrastructure of society, long before
quantum computers can tackle computations of a useful
size.
However, secure quantum communication is not a
solved problem. Although particular protocols have
been mathematically proved correct (for example, May-
ers’ analysis [11] of the Bennett-Brassard protocol
(BB84) [3] for quantum key distribution), this does not
guarantee the security of systems which use them. Ex-
perience of classical security analysis has shown that
even if protocols are theoretically secure, it is difficult
to achieve robust and reliable implementations of se-
cure systems : security can be compromised by flaws at
the implementation level or at the boundaries between
systems. To address this problem, computer scientists
have developed an impressive armoury of techniques
and tools for formal modelling, analysis and verification
of classical security protocols and communication sys-
tems which use them [21]. These techniques have been
remarkably successful both in establishing the security
of new protocols and in demonstrating flaws in proto-
cols which had previously been believed to be secure.
Their strength lies in the ability to model systems as
well as idealized protocols, and the flexibility to easily
re-analyze variations in design.
Our research programme is to develop techniques
and tools for formal modelling, analysis and verification
of quantum communication and cryptographic systems.
More precisely we aim to handle systems which com-
bine quantum and classical communication and com-
putation, for two reasons: the first quantum communi-
cation systems will implement communication between
classical computers; and protocols such as BB84 typi-
cally contain classical communication and computation
as well as quantum cryptography. We cannot simply
make use of existing techniques for classical security
analysis: for example, treating the security of quan-
tum cryptography axiomatically would not permit anal-
ysis of the protocols which construct quantum crypto-
graphic keys. Furthermore, the inherently probabilistic
nature of quantum systems means that not all verifica-
tion consists of checking absolute properties; we need a
probabilistic modelling and analysis framework.
Any formal analysis which involves automated tools
requires a modelling language with a precisely-defined
semantics. The purpose of this paper is to define a
language, CQP (Communicating Quantum Processes),
which will serve as the foundation for the programme
described above. CQP combines the communication
primitives of the pi-calculus [13, 23] with primitives for
transformation and measurement of quantum state. In
particular, qubits (quantum bits, the basic elements
of quantum data) can be transmitted along commu-
nication channels. In Section 3 we introduce CQP
through a series of examples which cover a wide spec-
trum of quantum information processing scenarios: a
quantum coin-flipping game; a quantum communica-
tion protocol known as teleportation; and a quantum
bit-commitment protocol. The latter will lead naturally
to a model of the BB84 quantum key-distribution pro-
tocol in future work. In Section 4 we formalize the syn-
tax of CQP and define an operational semantics which
combines non-determinism (arising in the same way as
in pi-calculus) with the probabilistic results of quan-
tum measurements. In Section 5 we define a static type
system which classifies data and communication chan-
nels, and crucially treats qubits as physical resources:
if process P sends qubit q to process Q, then P must
not access q subsequently, and this restriction can be
enforced by static typechecking. In Section 6 we prove
that the invariants of the type system are preserved by
the operational semantics, guaranteeing in particular
that at every point during execution of a system, every
qubit is uniquely owned by a single parallel component.
In Section 7 we outline our plans for further work, fo-
cusing on the use of both standard (non-deterministic)
and probabilistic model-checking systems.
Related Work
There has been a great deal of interest in quantum pro-
gramming languages, resulting in a number of proposals
in different styles, for example [8, 16, 22, 24, 27]. Such
languages can express arbitrary quantum state transfor-
mations and could be used to model quantum protocols
in those terms. However, our view is that any model
lacking an explicit treatment of communication is essen-
tially incomplete for the analysis of protocols; certainly
in the classical world, standard programming languages
are not considered adequate frameworks in which to an-
alyze or verify protocols. Nevertheless, Selinger’s func-
tional language QPL [24] in particular has influenced
our choice of computational operators for CQP.
The closest work to our own, developed simultane-
ously but independently, is Jorrand and Lalire’s QPAlg
[7], which also combines process-calculus-style commu-
nication with transformation and measurement of quan-
tum state. The most distinctive features of our work
are the type system and associated proofs, the explicit
formulation of an expression language which can easily
be extended, and our emphasis on a methodology for
formal verification.
The work of Abramsky and Coecke [2] is also rele-
vant. They define a category-theoretic semantic founda-
tion for quantum protocols, which supports reasoning
about systems and exposes deep connections between
quantum systems and programming language seman-
tics, but they do not define a formal syntax in which to
specify models. It will be interesting to investigate the
relationship between CQP and the semantic structures
which they propose.
2 Preliminaries
We briefly introduce the aspects of quantum theory
which are needed for the rest of the paper. For more
detailed presentations we refer the reader to the books
by Gruska [6] and Nielsen and Chuang [15]. Rieffel and
Polak [20] give an account aimed at computer scientists.
A quantum bit or qubit is a physical system which
has two states, conventionally written |0〉 and |1〉, cor-
responding to one-bit classical values. These could be,
for example, spin states of a particle or polarization
states of a photon, but we do not consider physical de-
tails. According to quantum theory, a general state of
a quantum system is a superposition or linear combi-
nation of basis states. Concretely, a qubit has state
α|0〉 + β|1〉, where α and β are complex numbers such
that |α|2+ |β|2 = 1; states which differ only by a (com-
plex) scalar factor with modulus 1 are indistinguishable.
States can be represented by column vectors:(
α
β
)
= α|0〉+ β|1〉.
Superpositions are illustrated by the quantum coin-
flipping game which we discuss in Section 3.1. Formally,
a quantum state is a unit vector in a Hilbert space, i.e.
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a complex vector space equipped with an inner product
satisfying certain axioms. In this paper we will restrict
attention to collections of qubits.
The basis {|0〉, |1〉} is known as the standard basis.
Other bases are sometimes of interest, especially the
diagonal (or dual, or Hadamard) basis consisting of the
vectors |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉). For
example, with respect to the diagonal basis, |0〉 is in a
superposition of basis states:
|0〉 = 1√
2
|+〉+ 1√
2
|−〉.
Evolution of a closed quatum system can be de-
scribed by a unitary transformation. If the state of
a qubit is represented by a column vector then a uni-
tary transformation U can be represented by a complex-
valued matrix (uij) such that U = U
∗, where U∗ is the
conjugate-transpose of U (i.e. element ij of U∗ is u¯ji).
U acts by matrix multiplication:(
α′
β′
)
=
(
u00 u01
u10 u11
)(
α
β
)
A unitary transformation can also be defined by its ef-
fect on basis states, which is extended linearly to the
whole space. For example, the Hadamard transforma-
tion is defined by
|0〉 7→ 1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉
|1〉 7→ 1√
2
|0〉 − 1√
2
|1〉
which corresponds to the matrix
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
The Hadamard transformation creates superpositions:
H|0〉 = |+〉 and H|1〉 = |−〉. We will also make use of the
Pauli transformations, denoted by either I, σx, σy, σz or
σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3:
I/σ0 σx/σ1 σy/σ2 σz/σ3(
1 0
0 1
) (
0 1
1 0
) (
0 −i
i 0
) (
1 0
0 −1
)
A key feature of quantum physics is the roˆle of mea-
surement. If a qubit is in the state α|0〉 + β|1〉 then
measuring its value gives the result 0 with probability
|α|2 (leaving it in state |0〉) and the result 1 with proba-
bility |β|2 (leaving it in state |1〉). Protocols sometimes
specify measurement with respect to a different basis,
such as the diagonal basis; this can be expressed as a
unitary change of basis followed by a measurement with
respect to the standard basis. Note that if a qubit is
in state |+〉 then a measurement with respect to the
standard basis give result 0 (and state |0〉) with prob-
ability 12 , and result 1 (and state |1〉) with probability
1
2 . If a qubit is in state |0〉 then a measurement with
respect to the diagonal basis gives result1 0 (and state
|+〉) with probability 12 , and result 1 (and state |−〉))
with probability 12 , because of the representation of |0〉
in the diagonal basis noted above. If a classical bit is
represented by a qubit using either the standard or di-
agonal basis, then a measurement with respect to the
correct basis results in the original bit, but a measure-
ment with respect to the other basis results in 0 or 1
with equal probability. This behaviour is used by the
quantum bit-commitment protocol which we discuss in
Section 3.3.
To go beyond single-qubit systems, we consider ten-
sor products of spaces (in contrast to the cartesian
products used in classical systems). If spaces U and
V have bases {ui} and {vj} then U ⊗ V has basis
{ui ⊗ vj}. In particular, a system consisting of n
qubits has a 2n-dimensional space whose standard ba-
sis is |00 . . . 0〉 . . . |11 . . . 1〉. We can now consider mea-
surements of single qubits or collective measurements
of multiple qubits. For example, a 2-qubit system has
basis |00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉 and a general state is α|00〉 +
β|01〉+ γ|10〉+ δ|11〉 with |α|2 + |β|2 + |γ|2 + |δ|2 = 1.
Measuring the first qubit gives result 0 with probability
|α|2+ |β|2 (leaving the system in state 1|α|2+|β|2 (α|00〉+
β|01〉)) and result 1 with probability |γ|2 + |δ|2 (leav-
ing the system in state 1|γ|2+|δ|2 (γ|10〉 + δ|11〉)). Mea-
suring both qubits simultaneously gives result 0 with
probability |α|2 (leaving the system in state |00〉), re-
sult 1 with probability |β|2 (leaving the system in state
|01〉) and so on; note that the association of basis states
|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉 with results 0, 1, 2, 3 is just a con-
ventional choice. The power of quantum computing,
in an algorithmic sense, results from calculating with
superpositions of states; all the states are transformed
simultaneously (quantum parallelism) and the effect in-
creases exponentially with the dimension of the state
space. The challenge in quantum algorithm design is to
make measurements which enable this parallelism to be
exploited; in general this is very difficult.
We will make use of the conditional not (CNot)
transformation on pairs of qubits. Its action on basis
states is defined by
|00〉 7→ |00〉 |01〉 7→ |01〉 |10〉 7→ |11〉 |11〉 7→ |10〉
which can be understood as inverting the second qubit
if and only if the first qubit is set, although in general
we need to consider the effect on non-basis states.
1Strictly speaking, the outcome of the measurement is just the
final state; the specific association of numerical results with final
states is a matter of convention.
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Systems of two or more qubits can exhibit the phe-
nomenon of entanglement, meaning that the states of
the qubits are correlated. For example, consider a mea-
surement of the first qubit of the state 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
The result is 0 (and resulting state |00〉) with probabil-
ity 12 , or 1 (and resulting state |11〉) with probability 12 .
In either case a subsequent measurement of the second
qubit gives a definite (non-probabilistic) result which is
always the same as the result of the first measurement.
This is true even if the entangled qubits are physically
separated. Entanglement illustrates the key difference
between the use of tensor product (in quantum systems)
and cartesian product (in classical systems): an entan-
gled state of two qubits is one which cannot be decom-
posed as a pair of single-qubit states. Entanglement is
used in an essential way in the quantum teleportation
protocol which we discuss in Section 3.2. That example
uses the CNot transformation to create entanglement:
CNot((H⊗ I)|00〉) = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
3 Examples of Modelling in CQP
3.1 A Quantum Coin-Flipping Game
Our first example is based on a scenario used by Meyer
[12] to initiate the study of quantum game theory. Play-
ers P and Q play the following game: P places a coin,
head upwards, in a box, and then the players take turns
(Q, then P , then Q) to optionally turn the coin over,
without being able to see it. Finally the box is opened
and Q wins if the coin is head upwards.
Clearly neither player has a winning strategy, but
the situation changes if the coin is a quantum system,
represented by a qubit (|0〉 for head upwards, |1〉 for
tail upwards). Turning the coin over corresponds to the
transformation σ1, and this is what P can do. But sup-
pose that Q can apply H, which corresponds to trans-
forming from head upwards (|0〉) to a superposition of
head upwards and tail upwards ( 1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉)), and does
this on both turns. Then we have two possible runs of
the game, (a) and (b):
(a)
Action State
|0〉
Q: H 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
P : σ1
1√
2
(|1〉+ |0〉)
Q: H |0〉
(b)
Action State
|0〉
Q: H 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
P : − 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
Q: H |0〉
and in each case the coin finishes head upwards. To
verify this we calculate that the state 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) is
invariant under σ1:(
0 1
1 0
)
1√
2
(
1
1
)
=
1√
2
(
1
1
)
and that the Hadamard transformation H is self-inverse:
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
=
(
1 0
0 1
)
Meyer considers game-theoretic issues relating to the
expected outcome of repeated runs, but we just model
a single run in CQP (Figure 1). Most of the syntax of
CQP is based on typed pi-calculus, using fairly com-
mon notation (for example, see Pierce and Sangiorgi’s
presentation [18]). P and Q communicate by means of
the typed channel s :̂[Qbit] which carries qubits. It is
a parameter of both P and Q. At the top level, System
creates s with (new s :̂[Qbit]) and starts P and Q in
parallel. Q and System are also parameterized by x,
the qubit representing the initial state of the coin.
Q applies (x ∗=H) the Hadamard transformation to
x; this syntax is based on Selinger’s QPL [24]. This
expression is converted into an action by {. . .}. Using
a standard pi-calculus programming style, Q creates a
channel t and sends (s![x, t]) it to P along with the qubit
x. P will use t to send the qubit back, and Q receives
it with t?[z :Qbit], binding it to the name z in the rest
of the code. Finally Q applies H again, and continues
with some behaviour C(z).
P contains two branches of behaviour, correspond-
ing to the possibilities of applying (second branch)
or not applying (first branch) the transformation σ1.
Both branches terminate with the null process 0. The
branches are placed in parallel2 and the operational se-
mantics means that only one of them interacts with Q;
the other is effectively Garbage (different in each case).
Figure 2 shows the execution (combining some steps)
of System according to the operational semantics which
we will define formally in Section 4. Reduction takes
place on configurations (σ;φ;P ) where σ is a list of
qubits and their collective state, φ lists the channels
which have been created, and P is a process term. Note
that the state of the qubits must be a global property in
order to be physically realistic. We record the channels
globally in order to give the semantics a uniform style;
this is different from the usual approach to pi-calculus
semantics, but (modulo garbage collection) is equivalent
to expanding the scope of every new before beginning
execution.
The execution of System tracks the informal cal-
culation which we worked through above. Our CQP
model makes the manipulation of the qubit very ex-
plicit; there are other ways to express the behaviour
(including putting everything into a single process with
no communication), but the point is that we have a
framework in which to discuss such issues.
2Simpler definitions can be obtained if we add guarded sums
to CQP; there is then no need for the channel t. This is straight-
forward but we have chosen instead to simplify the presentation
of the semantics.
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P(s :̂[Qbit]) = s?[y :Qbit, t :̂[Qbit]] . t![y] .0
| s?[y :Qbit, t :̂[Qbit]] . {y ∗= σ1} . t![y] .0
Q(x :Qbit, s :̂[Qbit]) = {x ∗= H} . (new t :̂[Qbit])(s![x, t] . t?[z :Qbit] . {z ∗= H} .C (z))
System(x :Qbit) = (new s :̂[Qbit])(P(s) |Q(x, s))
Figure 1: The quantum coin-flipping game in CQP
x = |0〉 ; ∅ ; System(x)
↓ expand definition
x = |0〉 ; ∅ ; (new s :̂[Qbit])(P(s) |Q(x, s))
↓ create channel s
x = |0〉 ; s ;P(s) |Q(x, s)
↓ expand definitions
x = |0〉 ; s ;
s?[y :Qbit, t :̂[Qbit]] . t![y] .0 | s?[y :Qbit, t :̂[Qbit]] . {y ∗= σ1} . t![y] .0
| {x ∗= H} . (new t :̂[Qbit])(s![x, t] . t?[z :Qbit] . {z ∗=H} .C (z)
↓ transform x
x = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ; s ;
s?[y :Qbit, t :̂[Qbit]] . t![y] .0 | s?[y :Qbit, t :̂[Qbit]] . {y ∗= σ1} . t![y] .0
| (new t :̂[Qbit])(s![x, t] . t?[z :Qbit] . {z ∗= H} .C (z))
↓ create channel t
x = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ; s, t ;
s?[y :Qbit, t :̂[Qbit]] . t![y] .0 | s?[y :Qbit, t :̂[Qbit]] . {y ∗= σ1} . t![y] .0
| s![x, t] . t?[z :Qbit] . {z ∗= H} .C (z)
ւ ց communication
x = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ; s, t ; x = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ; s, t ;
t![x] .0 | Garbage Garbage | {x ∗= σ1} . t![x] .0
| t?[z :Qbit] . {z ∗= H} .C (z) | t?[z :Qbit] . {z ∗=H} .C (z)
↓ ↓ transform x
x = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ; s, t ; x = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ; s, t ;
0 | Garbage | {x ∗= H} .C (x) Garbage | t![x] .0
| t?[z :Qbit] . {z ∗=H} .C (z)
↓ ↓ communication
x = |0〉 ; s, t ;Garbage | C (x) x = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ; s, t ;
Garbage | 0 | {x ∗= H} .C (x)
↓ transform x
x = |0〉 ; s, t ;Garbage | C (x)
Figure 2: Execution of the coin-flipping game
Alice(x :Qbit, c :̂[0..3], z :Qbit) = {z, x ∗= CNot} . {z ∗= H} . c![measure z, x] .0
Bob(y :Qbit, c :̂[0..3]) = c?[r :0..3] . {y ∗= σr} .Use(y)
System(x :Qbit, y :Qbit, z :Qbit) = (new c : [̂0..3])(Alice(x, c, z) | Bob(y, c))
Figure 3: Quantum teleportation in CQP
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x, y, z = 1√
2
|001〉+ 1√
2
|111〉 ; ∅ ; System(x, y, z)
↓ expand definition
x, y, z = 1√
2
|001〉+ 1√
2
|111〉 ; ∅ ; (new c :̂[0..3])(Alice(x, c, z) | Bob(y, c))
↓ create channel c
x, y, z = 1√
2
|001〉+ 1√
2
|111〉 ; c ;Alice(x, c, z) | Bob(y, c)
↓ expand definitions
x, y, z = 1√
2
|001〉+ 1√
2
|111〉 ; c ;
{z, x ∗= CNot} . {z ∗= H} . c![measure z, x] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . {y ∗= σr} .Use(y)
↓ permute x, y, z
z, x, y = 1√
2
|100〉+ 1√
2
|111〉 ; c ;
{z, x ∗= CNot} . {z ∗= H} . c![measure z, x] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . {y ∗= σr} .Use(y)
↓ transform z, x
z, x, y = 1√
2
|110〉+ 1√
2
|101〉 ; c ;
{z ∗= H} . c![measure z, x] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . {y ∗= σr} .Use(y)
↓ transform z
z, x, y = 12 |001〉+ 12 |010〉 − 12 |101〉 − 12 |110〉 ; c ;
c![measure z, x] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . {y ∗= σr} .Use(y)
↓ measure z, x
1
4 • (z, x, y = |001〉; a, c; c![0] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . {y ∗= σr} .Use(y))
⊞
1
4 • (z, x, y = |010〉; a, c; c![1] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . {y ∗= σr} .Use(y))
⊞
1
4 • (z, x, y = |101〉; a, c; c![2] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . {y ∗= σr} .Use(y))
⊞
1
4 • (z, x, y = |110〉; a, c; c![3] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . {y ∗= σr} .Use(y))
1
4 ↓ 14 ↓ 14 ↓ 14 ↓
z, x, y = |001〉 ; c ; z, x, y = |010〉 ; c ; z, x, y = |101〉 ; c ; z, x, y = |110〉 ; c ;
c![0] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . c![1] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . c![2] .0 | c?[r :0..3] . c![3] .0 | c?[r :0..3] .
{y ∗= σr} .Use(y) {y ∗= σr} .Use(y) {y ∗= σr} .Use(y) {y ∗= σr} .Use(y)
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ communication
z, x, y = |001〉 ; c ; z, x, y = |010〉 ; c ; z, x, y = |101〉 ; c ; z, x, y = |110〉 ; c ;
{y ∗= σ0} .Use(y) {y ∗= σ1} .Use(y) {y ∗= σ2} .Use(y) {y ∗= σ3} .Use(y)
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ transform y
z, x, y = |001〉 ; c ; z, x, y = |011〉 ; c ; z, x, y = −i|101〉 ; c ; z, x, y = −|111〉 ; c ;
Use(y) Use(y) Use(y) Use(y)
Figure 4: Execution of the quantum teleportation protocol
Alice ′(s :̂[Qbit], c :̂[0..3], z :Qbit) = s?[x :Qbit] .Alice(x, c, a)
Bob ′(t :̂[Qbit], c :̂[0..3]) = t?[y :Qbit] .Bob(y, c)
Source(s :̂[Qbit], t :̂[Qbit]) = (qbit x, y)({x ∗= H} . {x, y ∗= CNot} . s![x] . t![y] .0)
System′(z :Qbit) = (new c :̂[0..3], s :̂[Qbit], t :̂[Qbit])(Alice ′(s, c, z) | Bob ′(t, c) | Source(s, t))
Figure 5: Quantum teleportation with an EPR source
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Alice(x :Bit, xs :Bit List, c :̂[Qbit], d :̂[Bit], e :̂[Int], f :̂[Bit List]) =
e![length(xs)] .AliceSend(x, length(xs), xs, xs, c, d, e, f)
AliceSend(x :Bit, n : Int, xs :Bit List, ys :Bit List, c :̂[Qbit], d :̂[Bit], e :̂[Int], f :̂[Bit List]) =
if n = 0 then AliceReceive(x, length(ys), ys, c, d, e, f)
else (qbit q)( {if hd(xs) = 1 then q ∗= σx else unit} . {if x = 1 then q ∗= H else unit} . c![q] .
AliceSend(x, n− 1, tl(xs), ys, c, d, e, f))
AliceReceive(x :Bit, n : Int, ys :Bit List, d :̂[Bit], f :̂[Bit List]) = d?[g :Bit] . d![x] . f ![ys] .0
Bob(c :̂[Qbit], d :̂[Bit], e :̂[Int], f :̂[Bit List], r :̂[Bit]) = e?[n : Int] .BobReceive([ ], n, c, d, f, r)
BobReceive(m : (Bit ∗ Bit) List, n : Int, c :̂[Qbit], d :̂[Bit], e :̂[Int], f :̂[Bit List], r :̂[Bit]) =
if n = 0 then r?[g :Bit] . d![g] . d?[a :Bit] . f?[vs :Bit List] .BobVerify(m, vs, a, length(m))
else c?[x :Qbit] . r?[y :Bit] . {if y = 1 then x ∗= H else unit} .BobReceive(m@[(y,measure x)], n− 1, c, d, r)
BobVerify (m : (Bit ∗ Bit) List, vs :Bit List, a :Bit, n : Int) =
if n = 0 then Verified
else if fst(hd(m)) = a then
if snd(hd(m)) = hd(vs) then BobVerify(tl(m), tl(vs), a, n− 1)
else NotVerified
else BobVerify(tl(m), tl(vs), a, n− 1)
Random(r :̂[Bit]) = (qbit q)({q ∗= H} . r![measure q] .Random(r))
System(x :Bit, xs :Bit List) =
(new c :̂[Qbit], d :̂[Bit], e :̂[Int], f :̂[Bit List], r :̂[Bit])
(Alice(x, xs, c, d, e, f) | Bob(c, d, e, f, r) |Random(r))
Figure 6: Quantum bit-commitment in CQP
T ::= Int | Unit | Qbit | ̂[T˜ ] | Op(1) | Op(2) | . . .
v ::= x | 0 | 1 | . . . | unit | H | . . .
e ::= v | measure e˜ | e˜ ∗= e | e+e
P ::= 0 | (P | P ) | e?[x˜ : T˜ ] . P | e![e˜] . P | {e} . P | (new x :T )P | (qbit x)P
Figure 7: Syntax of CQP
v ::= . . . | q | c
E ::= [ ] | measure E, e˜ | measure v, E, e˜ | . . . | measure v˜, E | E, e˜ ∗= e | v, E, e˜ ∗= e
| . . . | v˜ ∗= E | E+e | v+E
F ::= [ ]?[x˜ : T˜ ] . P | [ ]![e˜] . P | v![[ ], e˜] . P | v![v, [ ], e˜] . P | . . . | v![v˜, [ ]] . P | {[ ]} . P
Figure 8: Internal syntax of CQP
P | 0 ≡ P P |Q ≡ Q | P P | (Q | R) ≡ (P |Q) |R
(S-Nil) (S-Comm) (S-Assoc)
Figure 9: Structural congruence
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3.2 Quantum Teleportation
The quantum teleportation protocol [4] is a procedure
for transmitting a quantum state via a non-quantum
medium. This protocol is particularly important: not
only is it a fundamental component of several more com-
plex protocols, but it is likely to be a key enabling tech-
nology for the development of the quantum repeaters [5]
which will be necessary in large-scale quantum commu-
nication networks.
Figure 3 shows a simple model of the quantum tele-
portation protocol. Alice and Bob each possess one
qubit (x for Alice, y for Bob) of an entangled pair whose
state is 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). At this point we are assuming
that appropriate qubits will be supplied to Alice and
Bob as parameters of the system. Alice is also parame-
terized by a qubit z, whose state is to be teleported. She
applies (z, x ∗= CNot) the conditional not transforma-
tion to z and x and then applies (z∗=H) the Hadamard
transformation to z, finally measuring z and x to yield a
two-bit classical value which she sends (c![measure z, x])
to Bob on the typed channel c :̂[0..3] and then termi-
nates (0). Bob receives (c?[r :0..3]) this value and uses
it to select3 a Pauli transformation σ0 . . . σ3 to apply
(y ∗= σr) to y. The result is that Bob’s qubit y takes
on the state of z, without a physical qubit having been
transmitted from Alice to Bob. Bob may then use y in
his continuation process Use(y).
This example introduces measurement, with a syn-
tax similar to that of Selinger’s QPL [24]. We treat
measurement as an expression, executed for its value as
well as its side-effect on the quantum state. Because the
result of a measurement is probabilistic, evaluation of a
measure expression introduces a probability distribution
over configurations: ⊞06i6n pi • (σi;φi;Pi). The next
step is a probabilistic transition to one of the configu-
rations; no reduction takes place underneath a proba-
bility distribution. In general a configuration reduces
non-deterministically to one of a collection of probabil-
ity distributions over configurations (in some cases this
is trivial, with only one distribution or only one configu-
ration within a distribution). A non-trivial probability
distribution makes a probabilistic transition to a single
configuration; this step is omitted in the case of a trivial
distribution.
Figure 4 shows the complete execution of System in
the particular case in which z, the qubit being tele-
ported, has state |1〉. The measurement produces a
probability distribution over four configurations, but
in all cases the final configuration (process Use(y))
has a state consisting of a single basis vector in which
y = |1〉. To verify the protocol for an arbitrary qubit,
3We can easily extend the expression language of CQP to allow
explicit testing of r.
we can repeat the calculation with initial state x, y, z =
α√
2
(|000〉+ |110〉) + β√
2
(|001〉+ |111〉).
Alice and Bob are parameterized by their parts (x, y)
of the entangled pair (and by the channel c). We can be
more explicit about the origin of the entangled pair by
introducing what is known in the physics literature as
an EPR source4 (computer scientists might regard it as
an entanglement server). This process constructs the
entangled pair (by using the Hadamard and controlled
not transformations) and sends its components to Alice
and Bob on the typed channels s, t :̂[Qbit]. Figure 5
shows the revised model.
3.3 Bit-Commitment
The bit-commitment problem is to design a protocol
such that Alice chooses a one-bit value which Bob then
attempts to guess. The key issue is that Alice must
evaluate Bob’s guess with respect to her original choice
of bit, without changing her mind; she must be com-
mitted to her choice. Similarly, Bob must not find out
Alice’s choice before making his guess. Bit-commitment
turns out to be an important primitive in cryptographic
protocols. Classical bit-commitment schemes rely on
assumptions on the computational complexity of cer-
tain functions; it is natural to ask whether quantum
techniques can remove these assumptions.
We will discuss a quantum bit-commitment protocol
due to Bennett and Brassard [3] which is closely related
to the quantum key-distribution protocol proposed in
the same paper and known as BB84. The following
description of the protocol is based on Gruska’s [6] pre-
sentation.
1. Alice randomly chooses a bit x and a sequence of
bits xs. She encodes xs as a sequence of qubits
and sends them to Bob. This encoding uses the
standard basis (representing 0 by |0〉 and 1 by |1〉)
if x = 0, and the diagonal basis (representing 0 by
|+〉 and 1 by |−〉) if x = 1.
2. Upon receiving each qubit, Bob randomly chooses
to measure it with respect to either the standard
basis or the diagonal basis. For each measurement
he stores the result and his choice of basis. If the
basis he chose matches Alice’s x then the result of
the measurement is the same as the corresponding
bit from xs ; if not, then the result is 0 or 1 with
equal probability. After receiving all of the qubits,
Bob tells Alice his guess at the value of x.
3. Alice tells Bob whether or not he guessed correctly.
To certify her claim she sends xs to Bob.
4EPR stands for Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen.
8
4. Bob verifies Alice’s claim by looking at the mea-
surements in which he used the basis correspond-
ing to x, and checking that the results are the same
as the corresponding bits from xs . He can also
check that the results of the other measurements
are sufficiently random (i.e. not significantly corre-
lated with the corresponding bits from xs).
Figure 6 shows our model of this protocol in CQP.
The complexity of the definitions reflects the fact that
we have elaborated much of the computation which is
implicit in the original description. The definitions use
the following features which are not present in our for-
malization of CQP, but can easily be added.
• The type constructor List and associated functions
and constructors such as hd, tl, length, [ ], @.
• Product types (∗) and functions such as fst, snd.
• if − then− else for expressions and processes.
• Recursive process definitions.
Alice is parameterized by x and xs; they could be ex-
plicitly chosen at random if desired. Bob uses m to
record the results of his measurements, and n (received
from Alice initially) as a recursion parameter. Bob re-
ceives random bits, for his choices of basis, from the
server Random ; he also guesses x randomly. The state
BobVerify carries out the first part of step (4) above,
but we have not included a check for non-correlation of
the remaining bits.
Communication between Alice and Bob uses four
separate channels, c, . . . , f . This proliferation of chan-
nels is a consequence of the fact that our type system
associates a unique message type with each channel. In-
troducing session types [25] would allow a single channel
to be used for the entire protocol, although it is worth
noting that depending on the physical implementation
of qubits, separation of classical and quantum channels
might be the most accurate model.
We intend to use this CQP model as the basis for
various kinds of formal analysis of the bit-commitment
protocol; we make some specific suggestions in Sec-
tion 7. We should point out, however, that this bit-
commitment protocol is insecure in that it allows Alice
to cheat: if each qubit which she sends to Bob is part of
an entangled pair, then Bob’s measurements transmit
information back to Alice which she can use to change
x after receiving Bob’s guess. The real value of quan-
tum bit-commitment is as a stepping-stone to the BB84
quantum key-distribution protocol, which has a very
similar structure and is already being used in practical
quantum communication systems.
4 Syntax and Operational Semantics
We now formally define the syntax and operational se-
mantics of the core of CQP, excluding named process
definitions and recursion, which can easily be added.
4.1 Syntax
The syntax of CQP is defined by the grammar in Fig-
ure 7. Types T consist of data types such as Int and Unit
(others can easily be added), the type Qbit of qubits,
channel types ̂[T1, . . . , Tn] (specifying that each mes-
sage is an n-tuple with component types T1, . . . , Tn) and
operator types Op(n) (the type of a unitary operator on
n qubits). The integer range type 0..3 used in the tele-
portation example is purely for clarification and should
be replaced by Int; we do not expect to typecheck with
range types.
We use the notation T˜ = T1, . . . , Tn and e˜ =
e1, . . . , en and write |e˜| for the length of a tuple. Values
v consist of variables (x, y, z etc.), literal values of data
types (0, 1, . . . and unit) and unitary operators such as
the Hadamard operator H. Expressions e consist of val-
ues, measurements measure e1, . . . , en, applications of
unitary operators e1, . . . , en ∗= e, and expressions in-
volving data operators such as e+ e′ (others can easily
be added). Note that although the syntax refers to mea-
surements and transformation of expressions e, the type
system will require these expressions to refer to qubits.
Processes P consist of the null (terminated) process 0,
parallel compositions P | Q, inputs e?[x˜ : T˜ ] . P (nota-
tion: x˜ : T˜ = x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn, declaring the types of
all the input-bound variables), outputs e![e˜] . P , actions
{e} . P (typically e will be an application of a unitary
operator), channel declarations (new x :T )P and qubit
declarations (qbit x)P . In inputs and outputs, the ex-
pression e will be constrained by the type system to
refer to a channel.
The grammar in Figure 8 defines the internal syn-
tax of CQP, which is needed in order to define the op-
erational semantics. Values are extended by two new
forms: qubit names q, and channel names c. Evalu-
ation contexts E[ ] (for expressions) and F [ ] (for pro-
cesses) are used in the definition of the operational se-
mantics, in the style of Wright and Felleisen [28]. The
structure of E[ ] is used to define call-by-value evalua-
tion of expressions; the hole [ ] specifies the first part of
the expression to be evaluated. The structure of F [ ] is
used to define reductions of processes, specifying which
expressions within a process must be evaluated.
Given a process P we define its free variables fv(P ),
free qubit names fq(P ) and free channel names fc(P )
in the usual way; the binders (of x or x˜) are y?[x˜ : T˜ ],
(qbit x) and (new x :T ).
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(σ;φ;u+v) −→v (σ;φ;w) if u and v are integer literals and u+ v = w (R-Plus)
(q0, . . . , qn−1 = α0|ψ0〉+ · · ·+ α2n−1|ψ2n−1〉;φ;measure q0, . . . , qr−1) −→v
⊞06m<2rpm • (q0, . . . , qn = αlmpm |ψlm〉+ · · ·+
αum
pm
|ψum〉;φ;m)
where lm = 2
n−rm, um = 2n−r(m+ 1)− 1, pm = |αlm |2 + · · ·+ |αum |2
(R-Measure)
(q0, . . . , qn−1 = |ψ〉;φ; q0, . . . , qr−1 ∗= U) −→v (q0, . . . , qn−1 = (U ⊗ In−r)|ψ〉;φ; unit)
where U is a unitary operator of arity r
(R-Trans)
(q0, . . . , qn−1 = |ψ〉;φ; e) −→v (qpi(0), . . . , qpi(n−1) = Π|ψ〉;φ; e)
where pi is a permutation and Π is the corresponding unitary operator
(R-Perm)
(σ;φ; e) −→v ⊞i pi • (σi;φi; ei)
(σ;φ;E[e]) −→e ⊞i pi • (σi;φi;E[ei]) (R-Context)
Figure 10: Reduction rules for expression configurations
4.2 Operational Semantics
The operational semantics of CQP is defined by reduc-
tions (small-step evaluations of expressions, or inter-
process communications) and probabilistic transitions.
The general form of a reduction is t −→ ⊞i pi • ti where
t and the ti are configurations consisting of expres-
sions or processes with state information. The nota-
tion ⊞i pi • ti denotes a probability distribution over
configurations, in which Σipi = 1; we may also write
this distribution as p1 • t1 ⊞ · · ·⊞ pn • tn. If the proba-
bility distribution contains a single configuration (with
probability 1) then we simply write t −→ t′. Probabil-
ity distributions reduce probabilistically to single con-
figurations: ⊞i pi • ti pi−→ ti (with probability pi, the
distribution ⊞i pi • ti reduces to ti).
The semantics of expressions is defined by the re-
duction relations −→v and −→e (Figure 10), both
on configurations of the form (σ;φ; e). If n qubits have
been declared then σ has the form q0, . . . , qn−1 = |ψ〉
where |ψ〉 = α0|ψ0〉 + · · · + α2n−1|ψ2n−1〉 is an el-
ement of the 2n-dimensional vector space with basis
|ψ0〉 = |0 . . . 0〉, . . . , |ψ2n−1〉 = |1 . . . 1〉. The remain-
ing part of the configuration, φ, is a list of channel
names. Reductions −→v are basic steps of evalua-
tion, defined by the rules R-Plus (and similar rules for
any other data operators), R-Measure and R-Trans.
Rule R-Perm allows qubits in the state to be per-
muted, compensating for the way thatR-Measure and
R-Trans operate on qubits listed first in the state.
Measurement specifically measures the values of a col-
lection of qubits; in the future we should generalize to
measuring observables as allowed by quantum physics.
Reductions −→e extend execution to evaluation
contexts E[ ], as defined by rule R-Context. Note that
the probability distribution remains at the top level.
Figure 11 defines the reduction relation −→ on
configurations of the form (σ;φ;P ). Rule R-Expr lifts
reductions of expressions to F [ ] contexts, again keeping
probability distributions at the top level. Rule R-Com
defines communication in the style of pi-calculus, mak-
ing use of substitution, which is defined in the usual
way (we assume that bound identifiers are renamed to
avoid capture). Rule R-Act trivially removes actions;
in general the reduction of the action expression to v
will have involved side-effects such as measurement or
transformation of quantum state. Rules R-New and
R-Qbit create new channels and qubits, updating the
state information in the configuration. Note that this
treatment of channel creation is different from standard
presentations of the pi-calculus; we treat both qubits
and channels as elements of a global store. Rule R-Par
allows reduction to take place in parallel contexts, again
lifting the probability distribution to the top level, and
rule R-Cong allows the use of a structural congruence
relation as in the pi-calculus. Structural congruence is
the smallest congruence relation (closed under the pro-
cess constructions) containing α-equivalence and closed
under the rules in Figure 9.
5 Type System
The typing rules defined in Figure 12 apply to the syn-
tax defined in Figure 7. Environments Γ are mappings
from variables to types in the usual way. Typing judge-
ments are of two kinds. Γ ⊢ e : T means that expres-
sion e has type T in environment Γ. Γ ⊢ P means that
process P is well-typed in environment Γ. The rules
for expressions are straightforward; note that in rule
T-Trans, x1, . . . , xn must be distinct variables of type
Qbit.
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(σ;φ; e) −→e ⊞i pi • (σi;φi; ei)
(σ;φ;F [e]) −→ ⊞i pi • (σi;φi;F [ei]) (R-Expr)
(σ;φ; c![v˜] . P | c?[x˜ : T˜ ] . Q) −→ (σ;φ;P |Q{v˜/x˜}) if |v˜| = |x˜| (R-Com)
(σ;φ; {v} . P ) −→ (σ;φ;P ) (R-Act)
(σ;φ; (new x :T )P ) −→ (σ;φ, c;P{c/x}) where c is fresh (R-New)
(q0, . . . , qn = |ψ〉;φ; (qbit x)P ) −→ (q0, . . . , qn, q = |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉;φ;P{q/x}) where q is fresh (R-Qbit)
(σ;φ;P ) −→ ⊞i pi • (σi;φi;Pi)
(σ;φ;P |Q) −→ ⊞i pi • (σi;φi;Pi |Q) (R-Par)
P ′ ≡ P (σ;φ;P ) −→ ⊞i pi • (σi;φi;Pi) ∀i.(Pi ≡ P ′i )
(σ;φ;P ′) −→ ⊞i pi • (σi;φi;P ′i )
(R-Cong)
⊞i pi • (σi;φi;Pi) pi−→ (σi;φi;Pi) (R-Prob)
Figure 11: Reduction rules for process configurations
In rule T-Par the operation + on environments
(Definition 1) is the key to ensuring that each qubit
is controlled by a unique part of a system. An implicit
hypothesis of T-Par is that Γ1 + Γ2 must be defined.
This is very similar to the linear type system for the
pi-calculus, defined by Kobayashi et al. [9].
Definition 1 (Addition of Environments)
The partial operation of adding a typed variable to an
environment, Γ + x :T , is defined by
Γ + x :T = Γ, x :T if x 6∈ dom(Γ)
Γ + x :T = Γ if T 6= Qbit and x :T ∈ Γ
Γ + x :T = undefined, otherwise
This operation is extended inductively to a partial oper-
ation Γ +∆ on environments.
Rule T-Out allows output of classical values and
qubits to be combined, but the qubits must be distinct
variables and they cannot be used by the continuation
of the outputting process (note the hypothesis Γ ⊢ P ).
The remaining rules are straightforward.
According to the operational semantics, execution of
(qbit ) and (new ) declarations introduces qubit names
and channel names. In order to be able to use the type
system to prove results about the behaviour of execut-
ing processes, we introduce the internal type system
(Figure 13). This uses judgements Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T and
Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ P where Σ is a set of qubit names and Φ is
a mapping from channel names to channel types. Most
of the typing rules are straightforward extensions of the
corresponding rules in Figure 12. Because references
to qubits may now be either variables or explicit qubit
names, the rules represent them by general expressions
e and impose conditions that e is either a variable or
a qubit name. This is seen in rules IT-Trans and
IT-Out. Note that in IT-Par, the operation Σ1 +Σ2
is disjoint union and an implicit hypothesis is that Σ1
and Σ2 are disjoint.
By standard techniques for linear type systems, the
typing rules in Figure 12 can be converted into a type-
checking algorithm for CQP models.
As an illustration of the linear control of qubits, con-
sider the coin-flipping example (Figure 1). In P , any
non-trivial continuation replacing 0 would not be able
to use the qubit y, which has been sent on t. In Q , after
the qubit x has been sent on s, the continuation cannot
use x. Of course, at run-time, the qubit variable z in
t?[z :Qbit] is instantiated by x, but that is not a problem
because P does not use x after sending it. In System, x
is used as an actual parameter of Q and therefore could
not also be used as an actual parameter of P (if P had
a formal parameter of type Qbit).
6 Soundness of the Type System
We prove a series of standard lemmas, following the ap-
proach of Wright and Felleisen [28], leading to a proof
that typing is preserved by execution of processes (The-
orem 1). We then prove that in a typable process, each
qubit is used by at most one of any parallel collection
of sub-processes (Theorem 2); because of type preserva-
tion, this property holds at every step of the execution
of a typable process. This reflects the physical reality
of the protocols which we want to model.
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Γ ⊢ v : Int if v is an integer literal Γ ⊢ unit : Unit (T-IntLit/T-Unit)
Γ ⊢ H : Op(2) etc. Γ, x :T ⊢ x : T (T-Op/T-Var)
Γ ⊢ e : Int Γ ⊢ e′ : Int
Γ ⊢ e+e′ : Int
Γ ⊢ e˜ : Q˜bit
Γ ⊢ measure e˜ : Int
(T-Plus/T-Msure)
∀i.(xi :Qbit ∈ Γ) x1 . . . xn distinct Γ ⊢ U : Op(n)
Γ ⊢ x1, . . . , xn ∗= U : Unit
(T-Trans)
Γ ⊢ 0
Γ1 ⊢ P Γ2 ⊢ Q
Γ1 + Γ2 ⊢ P |Q
(T-Nil/T-Par)
Γ ⊢ x : ̂[T1, . . . , Tn] Γ, y1 :T1, . . . , yn :Tn ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ x?[y1 :T1, . . . , yn :Tn] . P
Γ, x :Qbit ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ (qbit x)P (T-In/T-Qbit)
Γ ⊢ x : ̂[T1, . . . , Tm,Qbit, . . . ,Qbit] ∀i.(Ti 6= Qbit) ∀i.(Γ ⊢ ei : Ti) yi distinct Γ ⊢ P
Γ, y1 :Qbit . . . , yn :Qbit ⊢ x![e1, . . . , em, y1, . . . , yn] . P
(T-Out)
Γ ⊢ e : T Γ ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ {e} . P
Γ, x :̂[T1, . . . , Tn] ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ (new x :̂[T1, . . . , Tn])P (T-Act/T-New)
Figure 12: Typing rules
Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ v : Int if v is an integer literal Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ unit : Unit (IT-IntLit/IT-Unit)
Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ H : Op(2) etc. Γ, x :T ; Σ; Φ ⊢ x : T (IT-Op/IT-Var)
Γ; Σ, q; Φ ⊢ q : Qbit Γ;Σ;Φ, c :T ⊢ c : T (IT-IdQ/IT-IdC)
Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ e : Int Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e′ : Int
Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e+e′ : Int
Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e˜ : Q˜bit
Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ measure e˜ : Int
(IT-Plus/IT-Msure)
∀i.(Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ ei : Qbit) Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ U : Op(n) each ei is either xi or qi, all distinct
Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ e1, . . . , en ∗= U : Unit
(IT-Trans)
Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ 0
Γ1; Σ1; Φ ⊢ P Γ2; Σ2; Φ ⊢ Q
Γ1 + Γ2; Σ1 +Σ2; Φ ⊢ P |Q
(IT-Nil/IT-Par)
Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ e : ̂[T1, . . . , Tn] Γ, y1 :T1, . . . , yn :Tn; Σ; Φ ⊢ P
Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e?[y1 :T1, . . . , yn :Tn] . P
Γ, x :Qbit; Σ; Φ ⊢ P
Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ (qbit x)P (IT-In/IT-Qbit)
Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ e : ̂[T˜ , Q˜bit] ∀i.(Ti 6= Qbit) ∀i.(Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ ei : Ti)∀i.(Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ fi : Qbit) Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ P
f˜ consists of distinct variables f˜x and distinct qubit names f˜q
Γ, f˜x :Q˜bit; Σ, f˜q :Q˜bit; Φ ⊢ e![e1, . . . , em, f1, . . . , fn] . P
(IT-Out)
Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ P
Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ {e} . P
Γ, x :̂[T1, . . . , Tn]; Σ; Φ ⊢ P
Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ (new x :̂[T1, . . . , Tn])P (IT-Act/IT-New)
Figure 13: Internal typing rules
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We can also prove a standard runtime safety theo-
rem, stating that a typable process generates no com-
munication errors or incorrectly-applied operators, but
we have not included it in the present paper.
Lemma 1 (Typability of Subterms in E)
If D is a typing derivation concluding Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ E[e] : T
then there exists U such that D has a subderivation D′
concluding Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e : U and the position of D′ in D
corresponds to the position of the hole in E[ ].
Proof: By induction on the structure of E[ ]. 
Lemma 2 (Replacement in E) If
1. D is a derivation concluding Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ E[e] : T
2. D′ is a subderiv. of D concluding Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e : U
3. the position of D′ in D matches the hole in E[ ]
4. Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e′ : U
then Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ E[e′] : T .
Proof: Replace D′ in D by a deriv. of Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ e′ : U .
Lemma 3 (Type Preservation for −→v )
If Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T and (σ;φ; e) −→v ⊞ipi • (σi;φi; ei)
and Σ = dom(σ) and φ = dom(Φ) then ∀i.(σi = σ) and
∀i.(φi = φ) and ∀i.(Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ ei : T ).
Proof: Straightforward from the definition of −→v by
examining each case. 
Lemma 4 (Type Preservation for −→e )
If Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T and (σ;φ; e) −→e ⊞ipi • (σi;φi; ei)
and Σ = dom(σ) and φ = dom(Φ) then ∀i.(σi = σ) and
∀i.(φi = φ) and ∀i.(Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ ei : T ).
Proof: (σ;φ; e) −→e ⊞ipi • (σi;φi; ei) is derived by
R-Context, so for some E[ ] we have e = E[f ] and
∀i.(ei = E[fi]) and (σ;φ; f) −→v ⊞ipi • (σi;φi; fi).
From Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ E[f ] : T , Lemma 1 gives Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ f : U
for some U , Lemma 3 gives ∀i.(Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ f − i : U)
and ∀i.(σi = σ) and ∀i.(φi = φ), and Lemma 2 gives
∀i.(Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ E[fi] : T ). 
Lemma 5 (Typability of Subterms in F )
If D is a typing derivation concluding Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ F [e]
then there exists T such that D has a subderivation D′
concluding Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T and the position of D′ in D
corresponds to the position of the hole in F [ ].
Proof: By case-analysis on the structure of F [ ]. 
Lemma 6 (Replacement in F ) If
1. D is a derivation concluding Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ F [e]
2. D′ is a subderiv. of D concluding Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T
3. the position of D′ in D matches the hole in F [ ]
4. Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e′ : T
then Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ E[e′].
Proof: Replace D′ in D by a deriv. of Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ e′ : T .
Lemma 7 (Weakening for Expressions)
If Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T and Γ ⊆ Γ′ and Σ ⊆ Σ′ and Φ ⊆ Φ′
then Γ′; Σ′; Φ′ ⊢ e : T .
Proof: Induction on the derivation of Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T .
Lemma 8
If Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T then fv (e) ⊆ dom(Γ) and fq(e) ⊆ Σ
and fc(e) ⊆ dom(Φ).
Proof: Induction on the derivation of Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ e : T . 
Lemma 9
If Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ P then fv (P ) ⊆ dom(Γ) and fq(P ) ⊆ Σ and
fc(P ) ⊆ dom(Φ).
Proof: Induction on the derivation of Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ P . 
Lemma 10 (Substitution in Expressions)
Assume that Γ, x˜ : T˜ ; Σ; Φ ⊢ e : T and let v˜ be values
such that, for each i:
1. if Ti = Qbit then vi is a variable or a qubit name
2. if Ti = Qbit and vi = yi (a var) then yi 6∈ Γ, x˜ : T˜
3. if Ti = Qbit and vi = qi (a qubit name) then qi 6∈ Σ
4. if Ti 6= Qbit then Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ vi : Ti.
Let y˜ be the variables of type Qbit from v˜ (correspond-
ing to condition (2)) and assume that they are distinct;
let q˜ be the qubit names from v˜ (corresponding to con-
dition (3)) and assume that they are distinct. Then
Γ, y˜ :Q˜bit; Σ, q˜; Φ ⊢ e{v˜/x˜} : T .
Proof: Induction on the deriv. of Γ, x˜ : T˜ ; Σ; Φ ⊢ e : T .
Lemma 11 (Substitution in Processes)
Assume that Γ, x˜ : T˜ ; Σ; Φ ⊢ P and let v˜ be values such
that, for each i:
1. if Ti = Qbit then vi is a variable or a qubit name
2. if Ti = Qbit and vi = yi (a var) then yi 6∈ Γ, x˜ : T˜
3. if Ti = Qbit and vi = qi (a qubit name) then qi 6∈ Σ
4. if Ti 6= Qbit then Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ vi : Ti.
Let y˜ be the variables of type Qbit from v˜ (correspond-
ing to condition (2)) and assume that they are distinct;
let q˜ be the qubit names from v˜ (corresponding to con-
dition (3)) and assume that they are distinct. Then
Γ, y˜ :Q˜bit; Σ, q˜; Φ ⊢ P{v˜/x˜}.
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Proof: By induction on the derivation of Γ, x˜ : T˜ ; Σ; Φ ⊢
P . The key cases are T-Par and T-Out.
For T-Par the final step in the typing derivation has
the form
Γ1; Σ1; Φ ⊢ P Γ2; Σ2; Φ ⊢ Q
Γ, x˜ : T˜ ; Σ; Φ ⊢ P |Q
where Γ1 + Γ2 = Γ, x˜ : T˜ and Σ1 + Σ2 = Σ. Each
variable of type Qbit in Γ, x˜ : T˜ is in exactly one
of Γ1 and Γ2. Because the free variables of P and
Q are contained in Γ1 and Γ2 respectively, substitu-
tion into P | Q splits into disjoint substitutions into
P and Q. The induction hypothesis gives typings for
P{v˜/x˜} and Q{v˜/x˜}, which combine (by T-Par) to
give Γ, y˜ :Q˜bit; Σ, q˜; Φ ⊢ P |Q{v˜/x˜}. 
Lemma 12 (Struct. Cong. Preserves Typing)
If Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ P and P ≡ Q then Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ Q.
Proof: Induction on the derivation of P ≡ Q. 
Lemma 13 (External/Internal Type System)
Γ ⊢ e : T ⇒ Γ; ∅; ∅ ⊢ e : T and Γ ⊢ P ⇒ Γ; ∅; ∅ ⊢ P .
Proof: Induction on the derivations. 
Theorem 1 (Type Preservation for −→ )
If Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ P and (σ;φ;P ) −→ ⊞ipi • (σi;φi;Pi) and
Σ = dom(σ) and φ = dom(Φ) then ∀i.(σi = σ) and
∀i.(φi = φ) and ∀i.(Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ Pi).
Proof: By induction on the derivation of (σ;φ;P ) −→
⊞ipi • (σi;φi;Pi), in each case examining the final steps
in the derivation of Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ P . 
Theorem 2 (Unique Ownership of Qubits)
If Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ P |Q then fq(P ) ∩ fq(Q) = ∅.
Proof: The final step in the derivation of Γ; Σ;Φ ⊢ P |Q
has the form
Γ1; Σ1; Φ ⊢ P Γ2; Σ2; Φ ⊢ Q
Γ;Σ;Φ ⊢ P |Q
where Γ = Γ1 + Γ2 and Σ = Σ1 + Σ2. By Lemma 9,
fq(P ) ⊆ Σ1 and fq(Q) ⊆ Σ2. The implicit hypothesis
of the typing rule T-Par is that Σ1 + Σ2 is defined,
meaning that Σ1 ∩Σ2 = ∅. Hence fq(P )∩ fq(Q) = ∅.
7 Future Work
Our aim is to develop techniques for formal verifica-
tion of systems modelled in CQP. In particular we
are working towards an analysis of the BB84 quan-
tum key distribution protocol, including both the core
quantum steps and the classical authentication phase.
Initially we will use model-checking, in both standard
(non-deterministic) and probabilistic forms. Standard
model-checking is appropriate for absolute properties
(for example, the quantum teleportation protocol (Sec-
tion 3.2) claims that the final state of y is always the
same as the initial state of z). In general, however,
probabilistic model-checking is needed. For example,
the bit-commitment protocol (Section 3.3) guarantees
that, with some high probability which is dependent
on the number of bits used by Alice, Bob’s verification
step is successful. We have obtained preliminary results
[14, 17] with the CWB-NC [1] and PRISM [10] systems,
working directly with the modelling language of each
tool. The next step is to develop automated transla-
tions of CQP into these lower-level modelling languages;
note that our operational semantics matches the seman-
tic model used by PRISM.
Another major area for future work is to develop a
theory of equivalence for CQP processes, as a founda-
tion for compositional techniques for reasoning about
the behaviour of systems.
We can also consider extending the language. It
should be straightforward to add purely classical fea-
tures such as functions and assignable variables. Ex-
tensions which combine quantum data with enhanced
classical control structures require more care. Valiron’s
[26] recent formulation of a typed quantum lambda cal-
culus seems very compatible with our approach, and it
should fit into CQP’s expression language fairly easily.
8 Conclusions
We have defined a language, CQP, for modelling sys-
tems which combine quantum and classical communi-
cation and computation. CQP has a formal operational
semantics, and a static type system which guarantees
that transmitting a qubit on a communication channel
corresponds to a physical transfer of ownership.
The syntax and semantics of CQP are based on a
combination of the pi-calculus and an expression lan-
guage which includes measurement and transformation
of quantum state. The style of our definitions makes it
easy to enrich the language.
Our research programme is to use CQP as the basis
for analysis and verification of quantum protocols, and
we have outlined some possibilities for the use of both
standard and probabilistic model-checking.
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Abstrat
We dene a language CQP (Communiating Quantum
Proesses) for modelling systems whih ombine quan-
tum and lassial ommuniation and omputation.
CQP ombines the ommuniation primitives of the pi-
alulus with primitives for measurement and transfor-
mation of quantum state; in partiular, quantum bits
(qubits) an be transmitted from proess to proess
along ommuniation hannels. CQP has a stati type
system whih lassies hannels, distinguishes between
quantum and lassial data, and ontrols the use of
quantum state. We formally dene the syntax, oper-
ational semantis and type system of CQP, prove that
the semantis preserves typing, and prove that typing
guarantees that eah qubit is owned by a unique proess
within a system. We illustrate CQP by dening models
of several quantum ommuniation systems, and outline
our plans for using CQP as the foundation for formal
analysis and veriation of ombined quantum and las-
sial systems.
1 Introdution
Quantum omputing and quantum ommuniation have
attrated growing interest sine their ineption as re-
searh areas more than twenty years ago, and there has
been a surge of ativity among omputer sientists dur-
ing the last few years. While quantum omputing oers
the prospet of vast improvements in algorithmi eÆ-
ieny for ertain problems, quantum ryptography an
provide ommuniation systems whih will be seure
even in the presene of hypothetial future quantum

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eedings of
the 2nd International Workshop on Quantum Pro-
gramming Languages, Turku Centre for Computer
S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omputers. As a pratial tehnology, quantum om-
muniation has progressed far more rapidly than quan-
tum omputing. Seure ommuniation involving quan-
tum ryptography has reently been demonstrated in a
senario involving banking transations in Vienna [19℄,
systems are ommerially available from Id Quantique,
MagiQ Tehnologies and NEC, and plans have been re-
ported to establish a nationwide quantum ommunia-
tion network in Singapore. Seure quantum ommuni-
ation will undoubtedly beome a fundamental part of
the tehnologial infrastruture of soiety, long before
quantum omputers an takle omputations of a useful
size.
However, seure quantum ommuniation is not a
solved problem. Although partiular protools have
been mathematially proved orret (for example, May-
ers' analysis [11℄ of the Bennett-Brassard protool
(BB84) [3℄ for quantum key distribution), this does not
guarantee the seurity of systems whih use them. Ex-
periene of lassial seurity analysis has shown that
even if protools are theoretially seure, it is diÆult
to ahieve robust and reliable implementations of se-
ure systems: seurity an be ompromised by aws at
the implementation level or at the boundaries between
systems. To address this problem, omputer sientists
have developed an impressive armoury of tehniques
and tools for formalmodelling, analysis and veriation
of lassial seurity protools and ommuniation sys-
tems whih use them [21℄. These tehniques have been
remarkably suessful both in establishing the seurity
of new protools and in demonstrating aws in proto-
ols whih had previously been believed to be seure.
Their strength lies in the ability to model systems as
well as idealized protools, and the exibility to easily
re-analyze variations in design.
Our researh programme is to develop tehniques
and tools for formalmodelling, analysis and veriation
of quantum ommuniation and ryptographi systems.
More preisely we aim to handle systems whih om-
bine quantum and lassial ommuniation and om-
putation, for two reasons: the rst quantum ommuni-
ation systems will implement ommuniation between
lassial omputers; and protools suh as BB84 typi-
ally ontain lassial ommuniation and omputation
as well as quantum ryptography. We annot simply
make use of existing tehniques for lassial seurity
analysis: for example, treating the seurity of quan-
tum ryptography axiomatiallywould not permit anal-
ysis of the protools whih onstrut quantum rypto-
graphi keys. Furthermore, the inherently probabilisti
nature of quantum systems means that not all veria-
tion onsists of heking absolute properties; we need a
probabilisti modelling and analysis framework.
Any formal analysis whih involves automated tools
requires a modelling language with a preisely-dened
semantis. The purpose of this paper is to dene a
language, CQP (Communiating Quantum Proesses),
whih will serve as the foundation for the programme
desribed above. CQP ombines the ommuniation
primitives of the pi-alulus [13, 23℄ with primitives for
transformation and measurement of quantum state. In
partiular, qubits (quantum bits, the basi elements
of quantum data) an be transmitted along ommu-
niation hannels. In Setion 3 we introdue CQP
through a series of examples whih over a wide spe-
trum of quantum information proessing senarios: a
quantum oin-ipping game; a quantum ommunia-
tion protool known as teleportation; and a quantum
bit-ommitment protool. The latter will lead naturally
to a model of the BB84 quantum key-distribution pro-
tool in future work. In Setion 4 we formalize the syn-
tax of CQP and dene an operational semantis whih
ombines non-determinism (arising in the same way as
in pi-alulus) with the probabilisti results of quan-
tum measurements. In Setion 5 we dene a stati type
system whih lassies data and ommuniation han-
nels, and ruially treats qubits as physial resoures:
if proess P sends qubit q to proess Q, then P must
not aess q subsequently, and this restrition an be
enfored by stati typeheking. In Setion 6 we prove
that the invariants of the type system are preserved by
the operational semantis, guaranteeing in partiular
that at every point during exeution of a system, every
qubit is uniquely owned by a single parallel omponent.
In Setion 7 we outline our plans for further work, fo-
using on the use of both standard (non-deterministi)
and probabilisti model-heking systems.
Related Work
There has been a great deal of interest in quantum pro-
gramming languages, resulting in a number of proposals
in dierent styles, for example [8, 16, 22, 24, 27℄. Suh
languages an express arbitrary quantum state transfor-
mations and ould be used to model quantum protools
in those terms. However, our view is that any model
laking an expliit treatment of ommuniation is essen-
tially inomplete for the analysis of protools; ertainly
in the lassial world, standard programming languages
are not onsidered adequate frameworks in whih to an-
alyze or verify protools. Nevertheless, Selinger's fun-
tional language QPL [24℄ in partiular has inuened
our hoie of omputational operators for CQP.
The losest work to our own, developed simultane-
ously but independently, is Jorrand and Lalire's QPAlg
[7℄, whih also ombines proess-alulus-style ommu-
niation with transformation and measurement of quan-
tum state. The most distintive features of our work
are the type system and assoiated proofs, the expliit
formulation of an expression language whih an easily
be extended, and our emphasis on a methodology for
formal veriation.
The work of Abramsky and Coeke [2℄ is also rele-
vant. They dene a ategory-theoreti semanti founda-
tion for quantum protools, whih supports reasoning
about systems and exposes deep onnetions between
quantum systems and programming language seman-
tis, but they do not dene a formal syntax in whih to
speify models. It will be interesting to investigate the
relationship between CQP and the semanti strutures
whih they propose.
2 Preliminaries
We briey introdue the aspets of quantum theory
whih are needed for the rest of the paper. For more
detailed presentations we refer the reader to the books
by Gruska [6℄ and Nielsen and Chuang [15℄. Rieel and
Polak [20℄ give an aount aimed at omputer sientists.
A quantum bit or qubit is a physial system whih
has two states, onventionally written j0i and j1i, or-
responding to one-bit lassial values. These ould be,
for example, spin states of a partile or polarization
states of a photon, but we do not onsider physial de-
tails. Aording to quantum theory, a general state of
a quantum system is a superposition or linear ombi-
nation of basis states. Conretely, a qubit has state
j0i+ j1i, where  and  are omplex numbers suh
that jj
2
+ jj
2
= 1; states whih dier only by a (om-
plex) salar fator with modulus 1 are indistinguishable.
States an be represented by olumn vetors:




= j0i+ j1i:
Superpositions are illustrated by the quantum oin-
ipping game whih we disuss in Setion 3.1. Formally,
a quantum state is a unit vetor in a Hilbert spae, i.e.
2
a omplex vetor spae equipped with an inner produt
satisfying ertain axioms. In this paper we will restrit
attention to olletions of qubits.
The basis fj0i; j1ig is known as the standard basis.
Other bases are sometimes of interest, espeially the
diagonal (or dual, or Hadamard) basis onsisting of the
vetors j+i =
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i) and j i =
1
p
2
(j0i j1i). For
example, with respet to the diagonal basis, j0i is in a
superposition of basis states:
j0i =
1
p
2
j+i+
1
p
2
j i:
Evolution of a losed quatum system an be de-
sribed by a unitary transformation. If the state of
a qubit is represented by a olumn vetor then a uni-
tary transformationU an be represented by a omplex-
valued matrix (u
ij
) suh that U = U

, where U

is the
onjugate-transpose of U (i.e. element ij of U

is u
ji
).
U ats by matrix multipliation:


0

0

=

u
00
u
01
u
10
u
11




A unitary transformation an also be dened by its ef-
fet on basis states, whih is extended linearly to the
whole spae. For example, the Hadamard transforma-
tion is dened by
j0i 7!
1
p
2
j0i+
1
p
2
j1i
j1i 7!
1
p
2
j0i  
1
p
2
j1i
whih orresponds to the matrix
H =
1
p
2

1 1
1  1

:
The Hadamard transformation reates superpositions:
Hj0i = j+i and Hj1i = j i. We will also make use of the
Pauli transformations, denoted by either I; 
x
; 
y
; 
z
or

0
; 
1
; 
2
; 
3
:
I=
0

x
=
1

y
=
2

z
=
3

1 0
0 1
 
0 1
1 0
 
0  i
i 0
 
1 0
0  1

A key feature of quantum physis is the r^ole of mea-
surement. If a qubit is in the state j0i + j1i then
measuring its value gives the result 0 with probability
jj
2
(leaving it in state j0i) and the result 1 with proba-
bility jj
2
(leaving it in state j1i). Protools sometimes
speify measurement with respet to a dierent basis,
suh as the diagonal basis; this an be expressed as a
unitary hange of basis followed by a measurement with
respet to the standard basis. Note that if a qubit is
in state j+i then a measurement with respet to the
standard basis give result 0 (and state j0i) with prob-
ability
1
2
, and result 1 (and state j1i) with probability
1
2
. If a qubit is in state j0i then a measurement with
respet to the diagonal basis gives result
1
0 (and state
j+i) with probability
1
2
, and result 1 (and state j i))
with probability
1
2
, beause of the representation of j0i
in the diagonal basis noted above. If a lassial bit is
represented by a qubit using either the standard or di-
agonal basis, then a measurement with respet to the
orret basis results in the original bit, but a measure-
ment with respet to the other basis results in 0 or 1
with equal probability. This behaviour is used by the
quantum bit-ommitment protool whih we disuss in
Setion 3.3.
To go beyond single-qubit systems, we onsider ten-
sor produts of spaes (in ontrast to the artesian
produts used in lassial systems). If spaes U and
V have bases fu
i
g and fv
j
g then U 
 V has basis
fu
i

 v
j
g. In partiular, a system onsisting of n
qubits has a 2
n
-dimensional spae whose standard ba-
sis is j00 : : :0i : : : j11 : : :1i. We an now onsider mea-
surements of single qubits or olletive measurements
of multiple qubits. For example, a 2-qubit system has
basis j00i; j01i; j10i; j11i and a general state is j00i+
j01i+ j10i + Æj11i with jj
2
+ jj
2
+ jj
2
+ jÆj
2
= 1.
Measuring the rst qubit gives result 0 with probability
jj
2
+ jj
2
(leaving the system in state
1
jj
2
+jj
2
(j00i+
j01i)) and result 1 with probability jj
2
+ jÆj
2
(leav-
ing the system in state
1
jj
2
+jÆj
2
(j10i + Æj11i)). Mea-
suring both qubits simultaneously gives result 0 with
probability jj
2
(leaving the system in state j00i), re-
sult 1 with probability jj
2
(leaving the system in state
j01i) and so on; note that the assoiation of basis states
j00i; j01i; j10i; j11i with results 0; 1; 2; 3 is just a on-
ventional hoie. The power of quantum omputing,
in an algorithmi sense, results from alulating with
superpositions of states; all the states are transformed
simultaneously (quantum parallelism) and the eet in-
reases exponentially with the dimension of the state
spae. The hallenge in quantum algorithm design is to
make measurements whih enable this parallelism to be
exploited; in general this is very diÆult.
We will make use of the onditional not (CNot)
transformation on pairs of qubits. Its ation on basis
states is dened by
j00i 7! j00i j01i 7! j01i j10i 7! j11i j11i 7! j10i
whih an be understood as inverting the seond qubit
if and only if the rst qubit is set, although in general
we need to onsider the eet on non-basis states.
1
Stritly speaking, the outome of the measurement is just the
nal state; the spei assoiation of numerial results with nal
states is a matter of onvention.
3
Systems of two or more qubits an exhibit the phe-
nomenon of entanglement, meaning that the states of
the qubits are orrelated. For example, onsider a mea-
surement of the rst qubit of the state
1
p
2
(j00i+ j11i).
The result is 0 (and resulting state j00i) with probabil-
ity
1
2
, or 1 (and resulting state j11i) with probability
1
2
.
In either ase a subsequent measurement of the seond
qubit gives a denite (non-probabilisti) result whih is
always the same as the result of the rst measurement.
This is true even if the entangled qubits are physially
separated. Entanglement illustrates the key dierene
between the use of tensor produt (in quantum systems)
and artesian produt (in lassial systems): an entan-
gled state of two qubits is one whih annot be deom-
posed as a pair of single-qubit states. Entanglement is
used in an essential way in the quantum teleportation
protool whih we disuss in Setion 3.2. That example
uses the CNot transformation to reate entanglement:
CNot((H 
 I)j00i) =
1
p
2
(j00i+ j11i).
3 Examples of Modelling in CQP
3.1 A Quantum Coin-Flipping Game
Our rst example is based on a senario used by Meyer
[12℄ to initiate the study of quantum game theory. Play-
ers P and Q play the following game: P plaes a oin,
head upwards, in a box, and then the players take turns
(Q, then P , then Q) to optionally turn the oin over,
without being able to see it. Finally the box is opened
and Q wins if the oin is head upwards.
Clearly neither player has a winning strategy, but
the situation hanges if the oin is a quantum system,
represented by a qubit (j0i for head upwards, j1i for
tail upwards). Turning the oin over orresponds to the
transformation 
1
, and this is what P an do. But sup-
pose that Q an apply H, whih orresponds to trans-
forming from head upwards (j0i) to a superposition of
head upwards and tail upwards (
1
p
2
(j0i+j1i)), and does
this on both turns. Then we have two possible runs of
the game, (a) and (b):
(a)
Ation State
j0i
Q: H
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i)
P : 
1
1
p
2
(j1i+ j0i)
Q: H j0i
(b)
Ation State
j0i
Q: H
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i)
P :  
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i)
Q: H j0i
and in eah ase the oin nishes head upwards. To
verify this we alulate that the state
1
p
2
(j0i + j1i) is
invariant under 
1
:

0 1
1 0

1
p
2

1
1

=
1
p
2

1
1

and that the Hadamard transformation H is self-inverse:
1
p
2

1 1
1  1

1
p
2

1 1
1  1

=

1 0
0 1

Meyer onsiders game-theoreti issues relating to the
expeted outome of repeated runs, but we just model
a single run in CQP (Figure 1). Most of the syntax of
CQP is based on typed pi-alulus, using fairly om-
mon notation (for example, see Piere and Sangiorgi's
presentation [18℄). P and Q ommuniate by means of
the typed hannel s :b[Qbit℄ whih arries qubits. It is
a parameter of both P and Q. At the top level, System
reates s with (new s :b[Qbit℄) and starts P and Q in
parallel. Q and System are also parameterized by x,
the qubit representing the initial state of the oin.
Q applies (x =H) the Hadamard transformation to
x; this syntax is based on Selinger's QPL [24℄. This
expression is onverted into an ation by f: : :g. Using
a standard pi-alulus programming style, Q reates a
hannel t and sends (s![x; t℄) it to P along with the qubit
x. P will use t to send the qubit bak, and Q reeives
it with t?[z :Qbit℄, binding it to the name z in the rest
of the ode. Finally Q applies H again, and ontinues
with some behaviour C(z).
P ontains two branhes of behaviour, orrespond-
ing to the possibilities of applying (seond branh)
or not applying (rst branh) the transformation 
1
.
Both branhes terminate with the null proess 0. The
branhes are plaed in parallel
2
and the operational se-
mantis means that only one of them interats with Q;
the other is eetively Garbage (dierent in eah ase).
Figure 2 shows the exeution (ombining some steps)
of System aording to the operational semantis whih
we will dene formally in Setion 4. Redution takes
plae on ongurations (;;P ) where  is a list of
qubits and their olletive state,  lists the hannels
whih have been reated, and P is a proess term. Note
that the state of the qubitsmust be a global property in
order to be physially realisti. We reord the hannels
globally in order to give the semantis a uniform style;
this is dierent from the usual approah to pi-alulus
semantis, but (modulo garbage olletion) is equivalent
to expanding the sope of every new before beginning
exeution.
The exeution of System traks the informal al-
ulation whih we worked through above. Our CQP
model makes the manipulation of the qubit very ex-
pliit; there are other ways to express the behaviour
(inluding putting everything into a single proess with
no ommuniation), but the point is that we have a
framework in whih to disuss suh issues.
2
Simpler denitions an be obtained if we add guarded sums
to CQP; there is then no need for the hannel t. This is straight-
forward but we have hosen instead to simplify the presentation
of the semantis.
4
P(s :b[Qbit℄) = s?[y :Qbit; t :b[Qbit℄℄ : t![y℄ :0
j s?[y :Qbit; t :b[Qbit℄℄ : fy = 
1
g : t![y℄ :0
Q(x :Qbit; s :b[Qbit℄) = fx = Hg : (new t :b[Qbit℄)(s![x; t℄ : t?[z :Qbit℄ : fz = Hg :C (z))
System(x :Qbit) = (new s :b[Qbit℄)(P(s) jQ(x; s))
Figure 1: The quantum oin-ipping game in CQP
x = j0i ; ; ; System(x)
# expand denition
x = j0i ; ; ; (new s :b[Qbit℄)(P(s) jQ(x; s))
# reate hannel s
x = j0i ; s ;P(s) jQ(x; s)
# expand denitions
x = j0i ; s ;
s?[y :Qbit; t :b[Qbit℄℄ : t![y℄ :0 j s?[y :Qbit; t :b[Qbit℄℄ : fy = 
1
g : t![y℄ :0
j fx = Hg : (new t :b[Qbit℄)(s![x; t℄ : t?[z :Qbit℄ : fz = Hg :C (z)
# transform x
x =
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i) ; s ;
s?[y :Qbit; t :b[Qbit℄℄ : t![y℄ :0 j s?[y :Qbit; t :b[Qbit℄℄ : fy = 
1
g : t![y℄ :0
j (new t :b[Qbit℄)(s![x; t℄ : t?[z :Qbit℄ : fz = Hg :C (z))
# reate hannel t
x =
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i) ; s; t ;
s?[y :Qbit; t :b[Qbit℄℄ : t![y℄ :0 j s?[y :Qbit; t :b[Qbit℄℄ : fy = 
1
g : t![y℄ :0
j s![x; t℄ : t?[z :Qbit℄ : fz = Hg :C (z)
. & ommuniation
x =
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i) ; s; t ; x =
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i) ; s; t ;
t![x℄ :0 j Garbage Garbage j fx = 
1
g : t![x℄ :0
j t?[z :Qbit℄ : fz = Hg :C (z) j t?[z :Qbit℄ : fz = Hg :C (z)
# # transform x
x =
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i) ; s; t ; x =
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i) ; s; t ;
0 j Garbage j fx = Hg :C (x) Garbage j t![x℄ :0
j t?[z :Qbit℄ : fz = Hg :C (z)
# # ommuniation
x = j0i ; s; t ;Garbage j C (x) x =
1
p
2
(j0i+ j1i) ; s; t ;
Garbage j 0 j fx = Hg :C (x)
# transform x
x = j0i ; s; t ;Garbage j C (x)
Figure 2: Exeution of the oin-ipping game
Alie(x :Qbit;  :b[0::3℄; z :Qbit) = fz; x = CNotg : fz = Hg : ![measure z; x℄ :0
Bob(y :Qbit;  :b[0::3℄) = ?[r :0::3℄ : fy = 
r
g :Use(y)
System(x :Qbit; y :Qbit; z :Qbit) = (new  :b[0::3℄)(Alie(x; ; z) j Bob(y; ))
Figure 3: Quantum teleportation in CQP
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x; y; z =
1
p
2
j001i+
1
p
2
j111i ; ; ; System(x; y; z)
# expand denition
x; y; z =
1
p
2
j001i+
1
p
2
j111i ; ; ; (new  :b[0::3℄)(Alie(x; ; z) jBob(y; ))
# reate hannel 
x; y; z =
1
p
2
j001i+
1
p
2
j111i ;  ;Alie(x; ; z) j Bob(y; )
# expand denitions
x; y; z =
1
p
2
j001i+
1
p
2
j111i ;  ;
fz; x = CNotg : fz = Hg : ![measure z; x℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : fy = 
r
g :Use(y)
# permute x; y; z
z; x; y =
1
p
2
j100i+
1
p
2
j111i ;  ;
fz; x = CNotg : fz = Hg : ![measure z; x℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : fy = 
r
g :Use(y)
# transform z; x
z; x; y =
1
p
2
j110i+
1
p
2
j101i ;  ;
fz = Hg : ![measure z; x℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : fy = 
r
g :Use(y)
# transform z
z; x; y =
1
2
j001i+
1
2
j010i  
1
2
j101i  
1
2
j110i ;  ;
![measure z; x℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : fy = 
r
g :Use(y)
# measure z; x
1
4
 (z; x; y = j001i; a; ; ![0℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : fy = 
r
g :Use(y))

1
4
 (z; x; y = j010i; a; ; ![1℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : fy = 
r
g :Use(y))

1
4
 (z; x; y = j101i; a; ; ![2℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : fy = 
r
g :Use(y))

1
4
 (z; x; y = j110i; a; ; ![3℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : fy = 
r
g :Use(y))
1
4
#
1
4
#
1
4
#
1
4
#
z; x; y = j001i ;  ; z; x; y = j010i ;  ; z; x; y = j101i ;  ; z; x; y = j110i ;  ;
![0℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : ![1℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : ![2℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ : ![3℄ :0 j ?[r :0::3℄ :
fy = 
r
g :Use(y) fy = 
r
g :Use(y) fy = 
r
g :Use(y) fy = 
r
g :Use(y)
# # # # ommuniation
z; x; y = j001i ;  ; z; x; y = j010i ;  ; z; x; y = j101i ;  ; z; x; y = j110i ;  ;
fy = 
0
g :Use(y) fy = 
1
g :Use(y) fy = 
2
g :Use(y) fy = 
3
g :Use(y)
# # # # transform y
z; x; y = j001i ;  ; z; x; y = j011i ;  ; z; x; y =  ij101i ;  ; z; x; y =  j111i ;  ;
Use(y) Use(y) Use(y) Use(y)
Figure 4: Exeution of the quantum teleportation protool
Alie
0
(s :b[Qbit℄;  :b[0::3℄; z :Qbit) = s?[x :Qbit℄ :Alie(x; ; a)
Bob
0
(t :b[Qbit℄;  :b[0::3℄) = t?[y :Qbit℄ :Bob(y; )
Soure(s :b[Qbit℄; t :b[Qbit℄) = (qbit x; y)(fx = Hg : fx; y = CNotg : s![x℄ : t![y℄ :0)
System
0
(z :Qbit) = (new  :b[0::3℄; s :b[Qbit℄; t :b[Qbit℄)(Alie
0
(s; ; z) j Bob
0
(t; ) j Soure(s; t))
Figure 5: Quantum teleportation with an EPR soure
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Alie(x :Bit; xs :Bit List;  :b[Qbit℄; d :b[Bit℄; e :b[Int℄; f :b[Bit List℄) =
e![length(xs)℄ :AlieSend(x; length(xs); xs; xs; ; d; e; f)
AlieSend (x :Bit; n :Int; xs :Bit List; ys :Bit List;  :b[Qbit℄; d :b[Bit℄; e :b[Int℄; f :b[Bit List℄) =
if n = 0 then AlieReeive(x; length(ys); ys; ; d; e; f)
else (qbit q)( fif hd(xs) = 1 then q = 
x
else unitg : fif x = 1 then q = H else unitg : ![q℄ :
AlieSend(x; n  1; tl(xs); ys; ; d; e; f))
AlieReeive(x :Bit; n :Int; ys :Bit List; d :b[Bit℄; f :b[Bit List℄) = d?[g :Bit℄ : d![x℄ : f ![ys℄ :0
Bob( :b[Qbit℄; d :b[Bit℄; e :b[Int℄; f :b[Bit List℄; r :b[Bit℄) = e?[n :Int℄ :BobReeive([ ℄; n; ; d; f; r)
BobReeive(m :(Bit  Bit) List; n :Int;  :b[Qbit℄; d :b[Bit℄; e :b[Int℄; f :b[Bit List℄; r :b[Bit℄) =
if n = 0 then r?[g :Bit℄ : d![g℄ : d?[a :Bit℄ : f?[vs :Bit List℄ :BobVerify(m; vs; a; length(m))
else ?[x :Qbit℄ : r?[y :Bit℄ : fif y = 1 then x = H else unitg :BobReeive(m[(y;measure x)℄; n  1; ; d; r)
BobVerify(m : (Bit  Bit) List; vs :Bit List; a :Bit; n :Int) =
if n = 0 then Veried
else if fst(hd(m)) = a then
if snd(hd(m)) = hd(vs) then BobVerify(tl(m); tl(vs); a; n  1)
else NotVeried
else BobVerify(tl(m); tl(vs); a; n   1)
Random(r :b[Bit℄) = (qbit q)(fq = Hg : r![measure q℄ :Random(r))
System(x :Bit; xs :Bit List) =
(new  :b[Qbit℄; d :b[Bit℄; e :b[Int℄; f :b[Bit List℄; r :b[Bit℄)
(Alie(x; xs; ; d; e; f) j Bob(; d; e; f; r) jRandom(r))
Figure 6: Quantum bit-ommitment in CQP
T ::= Int j Unit j Qbit j b[
e
T ℄ j Op(1) j Op(2) j : : :
v ::= x j 0 j 1 j : : : j unit j H j : : :
e ::= v j measure e j e= e j e+e
P ::= 0 j (P j P ) j e?[ex :
e
T ℄ : P j e![e℄ : P j feg : P j (new x :T )P j (qbit x)P
Figure 7: Syntax of CQP
v ::= : : : j q j 
E ::= [ ℄ j measure E; e j measure v;E; e j : : : j measure ev;E j E; e= e j v;E; e= e
j : : : j ev =E j E+e j v+E
F ::= [ ℄?[ex:
e
T ℄ : P j [ ℄![e℄ : P j v![[ ℄;e℄ : P j v![v; [ ℄;e℄ : P j : : : j v![ev; [ ℄℄ : P j f[ ℄g : P
Figure 8: Internal syntax of CQP
P j 0  P P jQ  Q j P P j (Q jR)  (P jQ) jR
(S-Nil) (S-Comm) (S-Asso)
Figure 9: Strutural ongruene
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3.2 Quantum Teleportation
The quantum teleportation protool [4℄ is a proedure
for transmitting a quantum state via a non-quantum
medium. This protool is partiularly important: not
only is it a fundamental omponent of several more om-
plex protools, but it is likely to be a key enabling teh-
nology for the development of the quantum repeaters [5℄
whih will be neessary in large-sale quantum ommu-
niation networks.
Figure 3 shows a simple model of the quantum tele-
portation protool. Alie and Bob eah possess one
qubit (x for Alie, y for Bob) of an entangled pair whose
state is
1
p
2
(j00i+ j11i). At this point we are assuming
that appropriate qubits will be supplied to Alie and
Bob as parameters of the system. Alie is also parame-
terized by a qubit z, whose state is to be teleported. She
applies (z; x = CNot) the onditional not transforma-
tion to z and x and then applies (z=H) the Hadamard
transformation to z, nally measuring z and x to yield a
two-bit lassial value whih she sends (![measure z; x℄)
to Bob on the typed hannel  :b[0::3℄ and then termi-
nates (0). Bob reeives (?[r :0::3℄) this value and uses
it to selet
3
a Pauli transformation 
0
: : : 
3
to apply
(y = 
r
) to y. The result is that Bob's qubit y takes
on the state of z, without a physial qubit having been
transmitted from Alie to Bob. Bob may then use y in
his ontinuation proess Use(y).
This example introdues measurement, with a syn-
tax similar to that of Selinger's QPL [24℄. We treat
measurement as an expression, exeuted for its value as
well as its side-eet on the quantum state. Beause the
result of a measurement is probabilisti, evaluation of a
measure expression introdues a probability distribution
over ongurations: 
06i6n
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;P
i
). The next
step is a probabilisti transition to one of the ongu-
rations; no redution takes plae underneath a proba-
bility distribution. In general a onguration redues
non-deterministially to one of a olletion of probabil-
ity distributions over ongurations (in some ases this
is trivial, with only one distribution or only one ongu-
ration within a distribution). A non-trivial probability
distribution makes a probabilisti transition to a single
onguration; this step is omitted in the ase of a trivial
distribution.
Figure 4 shows the omplete exeution of System in
the partiular ase in whih z, the qubit being tele-
ported, has state j1i. The measurement produes a
probability distribution over four ongurations, but
in all ases the nal onguration (proess Use(y))
has a state onsisting of a single basis vetor in whih
y = j1i. To verify the protool for an arbitrary qubit,
3
We an easily extend the expression languageof CQP to allow
expliit testing of r.
we an repeat the alulation with initial state x; y; z =

p
2
(j000i+ j110i) +

p
2
(j001i+ j111i).
Alie and Bob are parameterized by their parts (x; y)
of the entangled pair (and by the hannel ). We an be
more expliit about the origin of the entangled pair by
introduing what is known in the physis literature as
an EPR soure
4
(omputer sientists might regard it as
an entanglement server). This proess onstruts the
entangled pair (by using the Hadamard and ontrolled
not transformations) and sends its omponents to Alie
and Bob on the typed hannels s; t :b[Qbit℄. Figure 5
shows the revised model.
3.3 Bit-Commitment
The bit-ommitment problem is to design a protool
suh that Alie hooses a one-bit value whih Bob then
attempts to guess. The key issue is that Alie must
evaluate Bob's guess with respet to her original hoie
of bit, without hanging her mind; she must be om-
mitted to her hoie. Similarly, Bob must not nd out
Alie's hoie before making his guess. Bit-ommitment
turns out to be an important primitive in ryptographi
protools. Classial bit-ommitment shemes rely on
assumptions on the omputational omplexity of er-
tain funtions; it is natural to ask whether quantum
tehniques an remove these assumptions.
We will disuss a quantum bit-ommitment protool
due to Bennett and Brassard [3℄ whih is losely related
to the quantum key-distribution protool proposed in
the same paper and known as BB84. The following
desription of the protool is based on Gruska's [6℄ pre-
sentation.
1. Alie randomly hooses a bit x and a sequene of
bits xs . She enodes xs as a sequene of qubits
and sends them to Bob. This enoding uses the
standard basis (representing 0 by j0i and 1 by j1i)
if x = 0, and the diagonal basis (representing 0 by
j+i and 1 by j i) if x = 1.
2. Upon reeiving eah qubit, Bob randomly hooses
to measure it with respet to either the standard
basis or the diagonal basis. For eah measurement
he stores the result and his hoie of basis. If the
basis he hose mathes Alie's x then the result of
the measurement is the same as the orresponding
bit from xs; if not, then the result is 0 or 1 with
equal probability. After reeiving all of the qubits,
Bob tells Alie his guess at the value of x.
3. Alie tells Bob whether or not he guessed orretly.
To ertify her laim she sends xs to Bob.
4
EPR stands for Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen.
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4. Bob veries Alie's laim by looking at the mea-
surements in whih he used the basis orrespond-
ing to x, and heking that the results are the same
as the orresponding bits from xs. He an also
hek that the results of the other measurements
are suÆiently random (i.e. not signiantly orre-
lated with the orresponding bits from xs).
Figure 6 shows our model of this protool in CQP.
The omplexity of the denitions reets the fat that
we have elaborated muh of the omputation whih is
impliit in the original desription. The denitions use
the following features whih are not present in our for-
malization of CQP, but an easily be added.
 The type onstrutor List and assoiated funtions
and onstrutors suh as hd, tl, length, [ ℄, .
 Produt types () and funtions suh as fst, snd.
 if   then   else for expressions and proesses.
 Reursive proess denitions.
Alie is parameterized by x and xs ; they ould be ex-
pliitly hosen at random if desired. Bob uses m to
reord the results of his measurements, and n (reeived
from Alie initially) as a reursion parameter. Bob re-
eives random bits, for his hoies of basis, from the
server Random ; he also guesses x randomly. The state
BobVerify arries out the rst part of step (4) above,
but we have not inluded a hek for non-orrelation of
the remaining bits.
Communiation between Alie and Bob uses four
separate hannels, ; : : : ; f . This proliferation of han-
nels is a onsequene of the fat that our type system
assoiates a unique message type with eah hannel. In-
troduing session types [25℄ would allow a single hannel
to be used for the entire protool, although it is worth
noting that depending on the physial implementation
of qubits, separation of lassial and quantum hannels
might be the most aurate model.
We intend to use this CQP model as the basis for
various kinds of formal analysis of the bit-ommitment
protool; we make some spei suggestions in Se-
tion 7. We should point out, however, that this bit-
ommitment protool is inseure in that it allows Alie
to heat: if eah qubit whih she sends to Bob is part of
an entangled pair, then Bob's measurements transmit
information bak to Alie whih she an use to hange
x after reeiving Bob's guess. The real value of quan-
tum bit-ommitment is as a stepping-stone to the BB84
quantum key-distribution protool, whih has a very
similar struture and is already being used in pratial
quantum ommuniation systems.
4 Syntax and Operational Semantis
We now formally dene the syntax and operational se-
mantis of the ore of CQP, exluding named proess
denitions and reursion, whih an easily be added.
4.1 Syntax
The syntax of CQP is dened by the grammar in Fig-
ure 7. Types T onsist of data types suh as Int and Unit
(others an easily be added), the type Qbit of qubits,
hannel types b[T
1
; : : : ; T
n
℄ (speifying that eah mes-
sage is an n-tuple with omponent types T
1
; : : : ; T
n
) and
operator types Op(n) (the type of a unitary operator on
n qubits). The integer range type 0::3 used in the tele-
portation example is purely for lariation and should
be replaed by Int; we do not expet to typehek with
range types.
We use the notation
e
T = T
1
; : : : ; T
n
and e =
e
1
; : : : ; e
n
and write jej for the length of a tuple. Values
v onsist of variables (x, y, z et.), literal values of data
types (0; 1; : : : and unit) and unitary operators suh as
the Hadamard operator H. Expressions e onsist of val-
ues, measurements measure e
1
; : : : ; e
n
, appliations of
unitary operators e
1
; : : : ; e
n
= e, and expressions in-
volving data operators suh as e+ e
0
(others an easily
be added). Note that although the syntax refers to mea-
surements and transformation of expressions e, the type
system will require these expressions to refer to qubits.
Proesses P onsist of the null (terminated) proess 0,
parallel ompositions P j Q, inputs e?[ex :
e
T ℄ : P (nota-
tion: ex :
e
T = x
1
:T
1
; : : : ; x
n
:T
n
, delaring the types of
all the input-bound variables), outputs e![e℄ : P , ations
feg : P (typially e will be an appliation of a unitary
operator), hannel delarations (new x :T )P and qubit
delarations (qbit x)P . In inputs and outputs, the ex-
pression e will be onstrained by the type system to
refer to a hannel.
The grammar in Figure 8 denes the internal syn-
tax of CQP, whih is needed in order to dene the op-
erational semantis. Values are extended by two new
forms: qubit names q, and hannel names . Evalu-
ation ontexts E[ ℄ (for expressions) and F [ ℄ (for pro-
esses) are used in the denition of the operational se-
mantis, in the style of Wright and Felleisen [28℄. The
struture of E[ ℄ is used to dene all-by-value evalua-
tion of expressions; the hole [ ℄ speies the rst part of
the expression to be evaluated. The struture of F [ ℄ is
used to dene redutions of proesses, speifying whih
expressions within a proess must be evaluated.
Given a proess P we dene its free variables fv(P ),
free qubit names fq(P ) and free hannel names f(P )
in the usual way; the binders (of x or ex) are y?[ex :
e
T ℄,
(qbit x) and (new x :T ).
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(;;u+v)  !
v
(;;w) if u and v are integer literals and u+ v = w (R-Plus)
(q
0
; : : : ; q
n 1
= 
0
j 
0
i+   + 
2
n
 1
j 
2
n
 1
i;;measure q
0
; : : : ; q
r 1
)  !
v

06m<2
r
p
m
 (q
0
; : : : ; q
n
=

l
m
p
m
j 
l
m
i +   +

u
m
p
m
j 
u
m
i;;m)
where l
m
= 2
n r
m, u
m
= 2
n r
(m+ 1)  1, p
m
= j
l
m
j
2
+   + j
u
m
j
2
(R-Measure)
(q
0
; : : : ; q
n 1
= j i;; q
0
; : : : ; q
r 1
= U)  !
v
(q
0
; : : : ; q
n 1
= (U 
 I
n r
)j i;; unit)
where U is a unitary operator of arity r
(R-Trans)
(q
0
; : : : ; q
n 1
= j i;; e)  !
v
(q
(0)
; : : : ; q
(n 1)
= j i;; e)
where  is a permutation and  is the orresponding unitary operator
(R-Perm)
(;; e)  !
v

i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
; e
i
)
(;;E[e℄)  !
e

i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;E[e
i
℄)
(R-Context)
Figure 10: Redution rules for expression ongurations
4.2 Operational Semantis
The operational semantis of CQP is dened by redu-
tions (small-step evaluations of expressions, or inter-
proess ommuniations) and probabilisti transitions.
The general form of a redution is t  ! 
i
p
i
 t
i
where
t and the t
i
are ongurations onsisting of expres-
sions or proesses with state information. The nota-
tion 
i
p
i
 t
i
denotes a probability distribution over
ongurations, in whih 
i
p
i
= 1; we may also write
this distribution as p
1
 t
1
    p
n
 t
n
. If the proba-
bility distribution ontains a single onguration (with
probability 1) then we simply write t  ! t
0
. Probabil-
ity distributions redue probabilistially to single on-
gurations: 
i
p
i
 t
i
p
i
 ! t
i
(with probability p
i
, the
distribution 
i
p
i
 t
i
redues to t
i
).
The semantis of expressions is dened by the re-
dution relations  !
v
and  !
e
(Figure 10), both
on ongurations of the form (;; e). If n qubits have
been delared then  has the form q
0
; : : : ; q
n 1
= j i
where j i = 
0
j 
0
i +    + 
2
n
 1
j 
2
n
 1
i is an el-
ement of the 2
n
-dimensional vetor spae with basis
j 
0
i = j0 : : :0i; : : : ; j 
2
n
 1
i = j1 : : :1i. The remain-
ing part of the onguration, , is a list of hannel
names. Redutions  !
v
are basi steps of evalua-
tion, dened by the rules R-Plus (and similar rules for
any other data operators), R-Measure and R-Trans.
Rule R-Perm allows qubits in the state to be per-
muted, ompensating for the way that R-Measure and
R-Trans operate on qubits listed rst in the state.
Measurement speially measures the values of a ol-
letion of qubits; in the future we should generalize to
measuring observables as allowed by quantum physis.
Redutions  !
e
extend exeution to evaluation
ontexts E[ ℄, as dened by rule R-Context. Note that
the probability distribution remains at the top level.
Figure 11 denes the redution relation  ! on
ongurations of the form (;;P ). Rule R-Expr lifts
redutions of expressions to F [ ℄ ontexts, again keeping
probability distributions at the top level. Rule R-Com
denes ommuniation in the style of pi-alulus, mak-
ing use of substitution, whih is dened in the usual
way (we assume that bound identiers are renamed to
avoid apture). Rule R-At trivially removes ations;
in general the redution of the ation expression to v
will have involved side-eets suh as measurement or
transformation of quantum state. Rules R-New and
R-Qbit reate new hannels and qubits, updating the
state information in the onguration. Note that this
treatment of hannel reation is dierent from standard
presentations of the pi-alulus; we treat both qubits
and hannels as elements of a global store. Rule R-Par
allows redution to take plae in parallel ontexts, again
lifting the probability distribution to the top level, and
rule R-Cong allows the use of a strutural ongruene
relation as in the pi-alulus. Strutural ongruene is
the smallest ongruene relation (losed under the pro-
ess onstrutions) ontaining -equivalene and losed
under the rules in Figure 9.
5 Type System
The typing rules dened in Figure 12 apply to the syn-
tax dened in Figure 7. Environments   are mappings
from variables to types in the usual way. Typing judge-
ments are of two kinds.   ` e : T means that expres-
sion e has type T in environment  .   ` P means that
proess P is well-typed in environment  . The rules
for expressions are straightforward; note that in rule
T-Trans, x
1
; : : : ; x
n
must be distint variables of type
Qbit.
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(;; e)  !
e

i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
; e
i
)
(;;F [e℄)  ! 
i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;F [e
i
℄)
(R-Expr)
(;; ![ev℄ : P j ?[ex:
e
T ℄ : Q)  ! (;;P jQfev=exg) if jevj = jexj (R-Com)
(;; fvg : P)  ! (;;P ) (R-At)
(;; (new x :T )P )  ! (;; ;Pf=xg) where  is fresh (R-New)
(q
0
; : : : ; q
n
= j i;; (qbit x)P )  ! (q
0
; : : : ; q
n
; q = j i 
 j0i;;Pfq=xg) where q is fresh (R-Qbit)
(;;P )  ! 
i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;P
i
)
(;;P jQ)  ! 
i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;P
i
jQ)
(R-Par)
P
0
 P (;;P )  ! 
i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;P
i
) 8i:(P
i
 P
0
i
)
(;;P
0
)  ! 
i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;P
0
i
)
(R-Cong)

i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;P
i
)
p
i
 ! (
i
;
i
;P
i
) (R-Prob)
Figure 11: Redution rules for proess ongurations
In rule T-Par the operation + on environments
(Denition 1) is the key to ensuring that eah qubit
is ontrolled by a unique part of a system. An impliit
hypothesis of T-Par is that  
1
+  
2
must be dened.
This is very similar to the linear type system for the
pi-alulus, dened by Kobayashi et al. [9℄.
Denition 1 (Addition of Environments)
The partial operation of adding a typed variable to an
environment,   + x :T , is dened by
  + x :T =  ; x :T if x 62 dom( )
  + x :T =   if T 6= Qbit and x :T 2  
  + x :T = undened, otherwise
This operation is extended indutively to a partial oper-
ation   +  on environments.
Rule T-Out allows output of lassial values and
qubits to be ombined, but the qubits must be distint
variables and they annot be used by the ontinuation
of the outputting proess (note the hypothesis   ` P ).
The remaining rules are straightforward.
Aording to the operational semantis, exeution of
(qbit ) and (new ) delarations introdues qubit names
and hannel names. In order to be able to use the type
system to prove results about the behaviour of exeut-
ing proesses, we introdue the internal type system
(Figure 13). This uses judgements  ;; ` e : T and
 ;; ` P where  is a set of qubit names and  is
a mapping from hannel names to hannel types. Most
of the typing rules are straightforward extensions of the
orresponding rules in Figure 12. Beause referenes
to qubits may now be either variables or expliit qubit
names, the rules represent them by general expressions
e and impose onditions that e is either a variable or
a qubit name. This is seen in rules IT-Trans and
IT-Out. Note that in IT-Par, the operation 
1
+ 
2
is disjoint union and an impliit hypothesis is that 
1
and 
2
are disjoint.
By standard tehniques for linear type systems, the
typing rules in Figure 12 an be onverted into a type-
heking algorithm for CQP models.
As an illustration of the linear ontrol of qubits, on-
sider the oin-ipping example (Figure 1). In P , any
non-trivial ontinuation replaing 0 would not be able
to use the qubit y, whih has been sent on t. In Q , after
the qubit x has been sent on s, the ontinuation annot
use x. Of ourse, at run-time, the qubit variable z in
t?[z :Qbit℄ is instantiated by x, but that is not a problem
beause P does not use x after sending it. In System , x
is used as an atual parameter of Q and therefore ould
not also be used as an atual parameter of P (if P had
a formal parameter of type Qbit).
6 Soundness of the Type System
We prove a series of standard lemmas, following the ap-
proah of Wright and Felleisen [28℄, leading to a proof
that typing is preserved by exeution of proesses (The-
orem 1). We then prove that in a typable proess, eah
qubit is used by at most one of any parallel olletion
of sub-proesses (Theorem 2); beause of type preserva-
tion, this property holds at every step of the exeution
of a typable proess. This reets the physial reality
of the protools whih we want to model.
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  ` v : Int if v is an integer literal   ` unit : Unit (T-IntLit=T-Unit)
  ` H : Op(2) et.  ; x :T ` x : T (T-Op=T-Var)
  ` e : Int   ` e
0
: Int
  ` e+e
0
: Int
  ` e :
g
Qbit
  ` measure e : Int
(T-Plus=T-Msure)
8i:(x
i
:Qbit 2  ) x
1
: : : x
n
distint   ` U : Op(n)
  ` x
1
; : : : ; x
n
= U : Unit
(T-Trans)
  ` 0
 
1
` P  
2
` Q
 
1
+  
2
` P jQ
(T-Nil=T-Par)
  ` x : b[T
1
; : : : ; T
n
℄  ; y
1
:T
1
; : : : ; y
n
:T
n
` P
  ` x?[y
1
:T
1
; : : : ; y
n
:T
n
℄ : P
 ; x :Qbit ` P
  ` (qbit x)P
(T-In=T-Qbit)
  ` x : b[T
1
; : : : ; T
m
;Qbit; : : : ;Qbit℄ 8i:(T
i
6= Qbit) 8i:(  ` e
i
: T
i
) y
i
distint   ` P
 ; y
1
:Qbit : : : ; y
n
:Qbit ` x![e
1
; : : : ; e
m
; y
1
; : : : ; y
n
℄ : P
(T-Out)
  ` e : T   ` P
  ` feg : P
 ; x :b[T
1
; : : : ; T
n
℄ ` P
  ` (new x :b[T
1
; : : : ; T
n
℄)P
(T-At=T-New)
Figure 12: Typing rules
 ; ; ` v : Int if v is an integer literal  ; ; ` unit : Unit (IT-IntLit=IT-Unit)
 ; ; ` H : Op(2) et.  ; x :T ; ;  ` x : T (IT-Op=IT-Var)
 ; ; q;  ` q : Qbit  ;;;  :T `  : T (IT-IdQ=IT-IdC)
 ; ; ` e : Int  ;; ` e
0
: Int
 ;; ` e+e
0
: Int
 ;; ` e :
g
Qbit
 ;; ` measure e : Int
(IT-Plus=IT-Msure)
8i:( ; ; ` e
i
: Qbit)  ; ; ` U : Op(n) eah e
i
is either x
i
or q
i
, all distint
 ;; ` e
1
; : : : ; e
n
= U : Unit
(IT-Trans)
 ; ; ` 0
 
1
; 
1
;  ` P  
2
; 
2
;  ` Q
 
1
+  
2
; 
1
+
2
;  ` P jQ
(IT-Nil=IT-Par)
 ; ; ` e : b[T
1
; : : : ; T
n
℄  ; y
1
:T
1
; : : : ; y
n
:T
n
; ;  ` P
 ;; ` e?[y
1
:T
1
; : : : ; y
n
:T
n
℄ : P
 ; x :Qbit; ;  ` P
 ;; ` (qbit x)P
(IT-In=IT-Qbit)
 ; ; ` e : b[
e
T;
g
Qbit℄ 8i:(T
i
6= Qbit) 8i:( ; ; ` e
i
: T
i
)
8i:( ; ; ` f
i
: Qbit)  ; ; ` P
e
f onsists of distint variables
e
f
x
and distint qubit names
e
f
q
 ;
e
f
x
:
g
Qbit; ;
e
f
q
:
g
Qbit;  ` e![e
1
; : : : ; e
m
; f
1
; : : : ; f
n
℄ : P
(IT-Out)
 ; ; ` e : T  ;; ` P
 ;; ` feg : P
 ; x :b[T
1
; : : : ; T
n
℄; ;  ` P
 ;; ` (new x :b[T
1
; : : : ; T
n
℄)P
(IT-At=IT-New)
Figure 13: Internal typing rules
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We an also prove a standard runtime safety theo-
rem, stating that a typable proess generates no om-
muniation errors or inorretly-applied operators, but
we have not inluded it in the present paper.
Lemma 1 (Typability of Subterms in E)
If D is a typing derivation onluding  ;; ` E[e℄ : T
then there exists U suh that D has a subderivation D
0
onluding  ;; ` e : U and the position of D
0
in D
orresponds to the position of the hole in E[ ℄.
Proof: By indution on the struture of E[ ℄. 
Lemma 2 (Replaement in E) If
1. D is a derivation onluding  ;; ` E[e℄ : T
2. D
0
is a subderiv. of D onluding  ;; ` e : U
3. the position of D
0
in D mathes the hole in E[ ℄
4.  ;; ` e
0
: U
then  ;; ` E[e
0
℄ : T .
Proof: Replae D
0
in D by a deriv. of  ; ; ` e
0
: U .
Lemma 3 (Type Preservation for  !
v
)
If  ;; ` e : T and (;; e)  !
v

i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
; e
i
)
and  = dom() and  = dom() then 8i:(
i
= ) and
8i:(
i
= ) and 8i:( ; ; ` e
i
: T ).
Proof: Straightforward from the denition of  !
v
by
examining eah ase. 
Lemma 4 (Type Preservation for  !
e
)
If  ;; ` e : T and (;; e)  !
e

i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
; e
i
)
and  = dom() and  = dom() then 8i:(
i
= ) and
8i:(
i
= ) and 8i:( ; ; ` e
i
: T ).
Proof: (;; e)  !
e

i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
; e
i
) is derived by
R-Context, so for some E[ ℄ we have e = E[f ℄ and
8i:(e
i
= E[f
i
℄) and (;; f)  !
v

i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
; f
i
).
From  ;; ` E[f ℄ : T , Lemma 1 gives  ;; ` f : U
for some U , Lemma 3 gives 8i:( ; ; ` f   i : U )
and 8i:(
i
= ) and 8i:(
i
= ), and Lemma 2 gives
8i:( ; ; ` E[f
i
℄ : T ). 
Lemma 5 (Typability of Subterms in F )
If D is a typing derivation onluding  ;; ` F [e℄
then there exists T suh that D has a subderivation D
0
onluding  ;; ` e : T and the position of D
0
in D
orresponds to the position of the hole in F [ ℄.
Proof: By ase-analysis on the struture of F [ ℄. 
Lemma 6 (Replaement in F ) If
1. D is a derivation onluding  ;; ` F [e℄
2. D
0
is a subderiv. of D onluding  ;; ` e : T
3. the position of D
0
in D mathes the hole in F [ ℄
4.  ;; ` e
0
: T
then  ;; ` E[e
0
℄.
Proof: Replae D
0
in D by a deriv. of  ; ; ` e
0
: T .
Lemma 7 (Weakening for Expressions)
If  ;; ` e : T and     
0
and   
0
and   
0
then  
0
; 
0
; 
0
` e : T .
Proof: Indution on the derivation of  ;; ` e : T .
Lemma 8
If  ;; ` e : T then fv(e)  dom( ) and fq(e)  
and f(e)  dom().
Proof: Indution on the derivation of  ;; ` e : T . 
Lemma 9
If  ;; ` P then fv (P )  dom( ) and fq(P )   and
f(P )  dom().
Proof: Indution on the derivation of  ;; ` P . 
Lemma 10 (Substitution in Expressions)
Assume that  ; ex :
e
T ; ;  ` e : T and let ev be values
suh that, for eah i:
1. if T
i
= Qbit then v
i
is a variable or a qubit name
2. if T
i
= Qbit and v
i
= y
i
(a var) then y
i
62  ; ex :
e
T
3. if T
i
= Qbit and v
i
= q
i
(a qubit name) then q
i
62 
4. if T
i
6= Qbit then  ;; ` v
i
: T
i
.
Let ey be the variables of type Qbit from ev (orrespond-
ing to ondition (2)) and assume that they are distint;
let eq be the qubit names from ev (orresponding to on-
dition (3)) and assume that they are distint. Then
 ; ey :
g
Qbit; ; eq;  ` efev=exg : T .
Proof: Indution on the deriv. of  ; ex :
e
T ; ;  ` e : T .
Lemma 11 (Substitution in Proesses)
Assume that  ; ex :
e
T ; ;  ` P and let ev be values suh
that, for eah i:
1. if T
i
= Qbit then v
i
is a variable or a qubit name
2. if T
i
= Qbit and v
i
= y
i
(a var) then y
i
62  ; ex :
e
T
3. if T
i
= Qbit and v
i
= q
i
(a qubit name) then q
i
62 
4. if T
i
6= Qbit then  ;; ` v
i
: T
i
.
Let ey be the variables of type Qbit from ev (orrespond-
ing to ondition (2)) and assume that they are distint;
let eq be the qubit names from ev (orresponding to on-
dition (3)) and assume that they are distint. Then
 ; ey :
g
Qbit; ; eq;  ` Pfev=exg.
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Proof: By indution on the derivation of  ; ex:
e
T ; ;  `
P . The key ases are T-Par and T-Out.
For T-Par the nal step in the typing derivation has
the form
 
1
; 
1
;  ` P  
2
; 
2
;  ` Q
 ; ex:
e
T ; ;  ` P jQ
where  
1
+  
2
=  ; ex :
e
T and 
1
+ 
2
= . Eah
variable of type Qbit in  ; ex :
e
T is in exatly one
of  
1
and  
2
. Beause the free variables of P and
Q are ontained in  
1
and  
2
respetively, substitu-
tion into P j Q splits into disjoint substitutions into
P and Q. The indution hypothesis gives typings for
Pfev=exg and Qfev=exg, whih ombine (by T-Par) to
give  ; ey :
g
Qbit; ; eq;  ` P jQfev=exg. 
Lemma 12 (Strut. Cong. Preserves Typing)
If  ;; ` P and P  Q then  ;; ` Q.
Proof: Indution on the derivation of P  Q. 
Lemma 13 (External/Internal Type System)
  ` e : T )  ; ;; ; ` e : T and   ` P )  ; ;; ; ` P .
Proof: Indution on the derivations. 
Theorem 1 (Type Preservation for  ! )
If  ;; ` P and (;;P )  ! 
i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;P
i
) and
 = dom() and  = dom() then 8i:(
i
= ) and
8i:(
i
= ) and 8i:( ; ; ` P
i
).
Proof: By indution on the derivation of (;;P )  !

i
p
i
 (
i
;
i
;P
i
), in eah ase examining the nal steps
in the derivation of  ;; ` P . 
Theorem 2 (Unique Ownership of Qubits)
If  ;; ` P jQ then fq(P ) \ fq(Q) = ;.
Proof: The nal step in the derivation of  ;; ` P jQ
has the form
 
1
; 
1
;  ` P  
2
; 
2
;  ` Q
 ;; ` P jQ
where   =  
1
+  
2
and  = 
1
+ 
2
. By Lemma 9,
fq(P )  
1
and fq(Q)  
2
. The impliit hypothesis
of the typing rule T-Par is that 
1
+ 
2
is dened,
meaning that 
1
\
2
= ;. Hene fq(P )\ fq(Q) = ;.
7 Future Work
Our aim is to develop tehniques for formal veria-
tion of systems modelled in CQP. In partiular we
are working towards an analysis of the BB84 quan-
tum key distribution protool, inluding both the ore
quantum steps and the lassial authentiation phase.
Initially we will use model-heking, in both standard
(non-deterministi) and probabilisti forms. Standard
model-heking is appropriate for absolute properties
(for example, the quantum teleportation protool (Se-
tion 3.2) laims that the nal state of y is always the
same as the initial state of z). In general, however,
probabilisti model-heking is needed. For example,
the bit-ommitment protool (Setion 3.3) guarantees
that, with some high probability whih is dependent
on the number of bits used by Alie, Bob's veriation
step is suessful. We have obtained preliminary results
[14, 17℄ with the CWB-NC [1℄ and PRISM [10℄ systems,
working diretly with the modelling language of eah
tool. The next step is to develop automated transla-
tions of CQP into these lower-level modelling languages;
note that our operational semantis mathes the seman-
ti model used by PRISM.
Another major area for future work is to develop a
theory of equivalene for CQP proesses, as a founda-
tion for ompositional tehniques for reasoning about
the behaviour of systems.
We an also onsider extending the language. It
should be straightforward to add purely lassial fea-
tures suh as funtions and assignable variables. Ex-
tensions whih ombine quantum data with enhaned
lassial ontrol strutures require more are. Valiron's
[26℄ reent formulation of a typed quantum lambda al-
ulus seems very ompatible with our approah, and it
should t into CQP's expression language fairly easily.
8 Conlusions
We have dened a language, CQP, for modelling sys-
tems whih ombine quantum and lassial ommuni-
ation and omputation. CQP has a formal operational
semantis, and a stati type system whih guarantees
that transmitting a qubit on a ommuniation hannel
orresponds to a physial transfer of ownership.
The syntax and semantis of CQP are based on a
ombination of the pi-alulus and an expression lan-
guage whih inludes measurement and transformation
of quantum state. The style of our denitions makes it
easy to enrih the language.
Our researh programme is to use CQP as the basis
for analysis and veriation of quantum protools, and
we have outlined some possibilities for the use of both
standard and probabilisti model-heking.
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